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Abstract 
Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their stock recommendations. For 
example, a ‘buy’ for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its peers in the same sector 
(“industry benchmarkers”), while for other brokers it means the stock is expected to outperform the 
market (“market benchmarkers”), or just some absolute return (“total benchmarkers”). We use these 
benchmarks to analyze the role of stock picking, industry picking and market timing in contributing to the 
performance of stock recommendations. We are able to do so given that different benchmarks suggest the 
use of different sets of abilities. Analysis of the relation between analysts’ recommendations and their 
long-term growth and earnings forecasts suggests that analysts indeed abide by their benchmarks: 
Industry benchmarkers rely less on across-industry information, and focus more on ranking firms within 
their industries. We find strong evidence that the investment value of stock recommendations stems from 
analysts picking winners and losers within a particular industry (stock picking). We find no evidence of 
either industry picking or market timing.  The research carries implications for the correct understanding 
and interpretation of sell-side research and its investment value. 
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1 Introduction 
It is well known that sell-side research analysts publish investment advice on stocks in the 
forms of recommendations such as ‘buys,’ ‘holds,’ and ‘sells.’ However, not all buys/holds/sells are 
created equal. An inspection of the disclosures in which analysts describe the meaning of their 
recommendations reveals that different brokers assign different meanings to their recommendations. 
For example, in one broker a ‘buy’ might mean that the stock is expected to outperform its industry 
peers (we call this broker an “industry benchmarker”); in another a ‘buy’ might mean that the stock 
is expected to outperform the market (“market benchmarker”); and in yet another, a ‘buy’ might 
mean that the stock is expected to earn a return that exceeds some pre-determined threshold such as 
10% (“total benchmarker”). Thus, ‘buy’ recommendations from different brokers carry with them 
very different literal meanings and investment advice.
1
  
We rely on these different benchmarks to explore analysts’ different abilities as they are 
reflected in stock recommendations. It is standard in the literature that market professionals 
(analysts, money managers, etc.) can potentially provide three types of insights about future stock 
performance: stock picking, industry picking and market timing. Stock picking is the ability to rank 
stocks within a small group of similar stocks such as an industry. Industry picking is the ability to 
identify hot and cold industries. Market timing is the ability to predict the future performance of the 
entire market. There is, however, a big debate as to whether market professionals can actually 
deliver these three different insights—particularly market timing— to their clients.2 
In this paper we shed light on this debate by investigating how these abilities are manifested 
in the investment advice from sell-side analysts. Partitioning the sample of recommendations based 
on the different benchmarks provides a unique opportunity to better isolate the three abilities and 
directly test for their presence. Because recommendations from industry benchmarkers aim at 
                                                          
1
 Unless otherwise noted, we use the term ‘buy’ to refer to optimistic recommendations, thus including both ‘strong 
buy’ and ‘buy’ recommendation levels, while ‘sell’ refers to recommendations with a pessimistic tone, thus including 
both ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’ recommendations levels. 
2
 There is evidence that analysts demonstrate stock picking in firm recommendations (Boni and Womack, 2006) and 
industry picking in industry recommendations (Kadan et al., 2012). Market timing has been more elusive: The ability is 
not demonstrated by investment newsletters (Graham and Harvey, 1994, 1996, 1997), hedge fund managers (Fung, Xu, 
and Yao, 2002) and pension fund managers (Goggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman, 1993), while for mutual fund managers the 
evidence is mixed (Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Henriksson, 1984; Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; 
and Becker, Ferson, Myers and Schill, 1999, do not find evidence of market timing, while Bollen and Busse, 2001; and 
Jiang, Yao, and Yu, 2007, show evidence in favor of it).  
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beating industry peers, they are expected to reflect only stock picking. Recommendations from 
market benchmarkers, whose objective is to outperform a market index, are expected to incorporate 
both stock picking and industry picking. Finally, recommendations from total benchmarkers are 
compared to an absolute return threshold, and are thus expected to reflect all three types of abilities.  
Our main research question asks whether analysts possess any one of the three abilities. To 
address this question we proceed as follows. First, given that the data on benchmarks have never 
been studied previously, we begin our exploration by providing some descriptive analysis of the 
nature of these benchmarks. Second, and more importantly, we verify whether analysts abide by 
their benchmarks. To do so, we examine the extent to which these benchmarks affect the way 
analysts incorporate fundamental information into their stock recommendations. Third, we examine 
the overall performance of each recommendation, taking into considerations the benchmark that is 
being used. Finally, we decompose the stock returns following each recommendation, allowing us 
to analyze the three aforementioned abilities.  
Beginning in September of 2002, and following Rule NASD 2711, Rule NYSE 472, and the 
Global Settlement, brokers are required to define in each report the literal meaning of their 
recommendations, including the benchmark to be used when interpreting the recommendation 
advice. To examine our research questions we hand-collect, mostly from full-text analyst reports, 
the meaning of recommendations for 173 brokers accounting for over 94% of all recommendations 
issued during our sample period (September 2002-December 2009). We find that the most prevalent 
benchmarks are industry benchmarks (21% of brokers), market benchmarks (20% of brokers), and 
total benchmarks (25% of brokers).  Other brokers typically use either combinations or risk-
adjusted versions of these three benchmarks. Given their popularity, the simplicity of their meaning, 
and because they provide a more intuitive mapping to analysts’ abilities, we focus our empirical 
analysis on brokers employing these three benchmarks exclusively. 
It is possible that the benchmarks are a pure formality, and that they are ignored by analysts 
when they issue recommendations. We examine this conjecture by asking whether brokers indeed 
abide by their benchmarks. To answer this question we relate stock recommendations to analysts’ 
outputs regarding firms’ fundamentals. We expect that industry benchmarkers would practice stock 
picking by primarily using within-industry information about those fundamentals, while market and 
total benchmarkers—who profess to use both stock picking and industry picking—would also rely 
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on across-industry information. We test this conjecture by examining how analysts’ 
recommendations are related to other types of forecasts issued by analysts. To this end, we break 
down analysts’ earnings and long-term growth (LTG) forecasts into within- and across-industry 
components. Our analysis shows that, as expected, market and total benchmarkers place more 
weight on across-industry expectations than industry benchmarkers when forming their 
recommendations. We also find evidence that total benchmarkers attempt to incorporate market 
timing in their recommendations. In particular, compared to market benchmarkers, total 
benchmarkers incorporate into their recommendations more negative news about the economy 
during the 2007-2009 recession. These results are consistent with analysts indeed abiding by their 
benchmarks.  
Next, we examine whether recommendations based on a particular benchmark are successful 
in meeting (or beating) their performance objectives. To this end, we collect for each broker the 
target return associated with its benchmark. For example, a target return for a ‘buy’ 
recommendation issued by an industry (market) benchmarker specifies by how much the 
recommended firm is expected to beat the industry (market). Similarly, a target return for a ‘buy’ 
recommendation issued by a total benchmarker specifies an absolute return such as 10%. We then 
examine whether and by how much the return of a recommended firm meets or beats its stated 
objective—which considers both the benchmark (industry or market) and the target returns—within 
a year or until the recommendation is changed.  
About 50% (58%) of ‘buy’ (‘sell’) recommendations issued by industry and market 
benchmarkers meet or beat their objective, compared to 39% (37%) of ‘buy’ (‘sell’) 
recommendations issued by total benchmarkers. The higher success rates of industry and market 
benchmarkers compared to total benchmarkers is also apparent when we examine the difference 
between the actual returns and the stated objective. For example, ‘buy’ recommendations issued by 
industry (market) benchmarkers beat their objective by an average of 2.93% (5.60%), while the 
average return following ‘buy’ recommendations issued by total benchmarkers is 4.85% lower than 
their target return. These results seem plausible, as meeting the objective for total benchmarkers is 
quite a heroic task for two reasons. First, total benchmarkers are tasked with predicting firm-
specific returns, industry returns and market returns. Second, the target return total benchmarkers 
are faced with is relatively high (about 15%), compared with the targets faced by industry and 
market benchmarkers (about 0%).  
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When comparing a recommendation return with its stated objective, we are evaluating the 
analyst performance based on the literal meaning of her recommendation advice. While this 
evaluation method is relevant, it might be inadequate to capture the incremental insights offered by 
the analyst. One concern, as mentioned above, is that the stated objective might simply be too 
tough. Another concern is that this method does not control for the risk profile of the recommended 
stocks, thus crediting to the analyst any performance that is in fact coming from loadings on risk 
factors. In other words, one needs to establish a baseline against which to evaluate the analyst.  
We define the baseline for the performance of a recommendation as the performance of a 
firm with similar risk and subject to the same objective as the actual recommendation. To 
implement this, we use a propensity score methodology to match each actual recommendation (i.e., 
a firm receiving a recommendation at some point in time) to a control unit (some other firm and 
another point in time) with a similar risk profile. We compare the returns in excess of the stated 
objective between the actual recommendations and their associated control units. We find that for 
all types of benchmarks, firms for which analysts issue ‘buy’ (‘sell’) recommendations perform 
better (worse) than firms with similar risk characteristics that did not receive such 
recommendations. In particular, while the 39% success rate in meeting or beating its stated 
objective for ‘buys’ from total benchmarks seems at first to denote a poor performance, it is in fact a 
significant improvement over a baseline success rate of 31%. 
Having attested that recommendations perform better than what their risk characteristics 
would imply, in our final analysis we explore the sources of this superior performance. We ask 
whether analysts possess any one of the three abilities: stock picking, industry picking and market 
timing. To evaluate these three abilities, we decompose the returns in excess of the 
recommendations’ stated objective into components that measure each such ability. For example, 
for market benchmarkers the excess return following a recommendation (the difference between the 
firm return and the market return) is split into two components: (i) the difference between the firm 
return and its industry’s return captures stock picking; (ii) and the difference between the industry 
return and the market return captures industry picking. Similar to the previous analysis, we compare 
each return component of an actual recommendation to that of its control unit.  
We document strong evidence of stock picking ability across all types of analysts. For 
example, for market benchmarkers the returns associated with ‘buy’ recommendations exceed 
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industry returns by 521 basis points compared to 135 basis points for the control units. This is 
consistent with the evidence in Boni and Womack (2006), who find that analysts are good at 
ranking firms within industries. On the other hand, our results do not indicate any industry picking 
ability for market or total benchmarkers. This contrasts with the evidence in Kadan et al. (2012), 
who demonstrate that industry recommendations reflect industry picking among strategy analysts. 
Finally, we do not find evidence of market timing among total benchmarkers. Thus, our evidence 
suggests that analysts’ skills are limited to stock picking: The performance of their stock 
recommendations is driven by the ability to pick winners and losers within an industry, even for 
analysts who profess, and try, to incorporate industry picking and/or market timing into their 
recommendations.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we provide a comprehensive analysis 
of how stock picking, industry picking, and market timing play a role in shaping analysts’ stock 
recommendations. We are able to do so by relying on partitioning the sample of stock 
recommendations based on the benchmarks used by different brokers. This partitioning enables us 
to better analyze each ability because different analysts profess to use different sets of abilities. In 
particular, only total benchmarkers claim to incorporate market timing. As a result, we increase the 
power of the test that evaluates the presence of market timing by restricting it to the sample of total 
benchmarkers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that evaluates market timing in 
stock recommendations. In addition, we contribute to the literature on stock picking (starting with 
Boni and Womack, 2006), and on industry picking (Kadan et al. (2012).  
Second, in Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) we study different aspects of 
analysts’ industry expertise. In one of the analyses we point out the existence of sell-side 
benchmarks, and use a small sample of disclosures from 20 brokers to study the relation between 
firm and industry recommendations. In contrast, in this paper we focus exclusively on these sell-
side benchmarks, for which we provide the first large scale and comprehensive analysis. Thus, we 
contribute to the literature by documenting the attributes of these benchmarks, exploring the way in 
which they are reflected in analysts’ recommendations, and by studying their implications for 
investment value. 
Third, our paper also relates to a long strand of literature examining the relation between 
stock recommendations and other outputs produced by analysts such as earnings forecasts, price-
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targets, and long-term forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004; Ertimur, Sunder and Sunder, 2007; Chen 
and Chen, 2009; Barniv et al., 2009; Brown and Huang, 2010; Kecskes, Michaely and Womack, 
2010). Our analysis emphasizes that the usual method to assess the relation between 
recommendations and other analysts’ outputs can be improved upon: When regressing 
recommendations on expectations of earnings and LTG, for example, we observe an inconsistency 
in that recommendations can be industry-adjusted statements (in the case of industry 
benchmarkers), while expectations of earnings and LTG are not.  
Finally, in analyzing whether recommendations perform as predicted, we depart from the 
usual approach taken in the literature. For the most part, the literature has assessed the value of 
analysts’ recommendations through the investment value obtained from following a set of 
recommendations, for example by looking at risk-adjusted returns relative to CAPM or a 
multifactor model, obtained from portfolios formed based on recommendations (e.g., Womack 
(1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001 and 2006; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and 
Lee, 2005). While this approach is useful from the perspective of an investor that diversifies her 
investment over many recommendations, we argue that this is at best an imperfect measure of 
whether each recommendation performs according to its objective. Nothing in the disclosed 
meaning of a recommendation suggests that it should be seen as a prediction about risk-adjusted 
performance (other than benchmark-adjusted performance), nor that it should be assessed after it is 
combined with other recommendations. Instead, the literal meaning of a recommendation provides 
a very clear predictive rule about how its advice should be taken. Our assessment of the 
recommendation value follows this rule directly.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides some preliminary 
analysis of the benchmarks used by different brokers. In Section 4 we examine whether analysts 
abide by their benchmarks. In Section 5 we explore whether analysts are successful in meeting their 
benchmark-specific targets, and evaluate whether stock recommendations reflect any one of the 
three abilities: stock picking, industry picking, and market timing. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Data 
We focus on analysts’ stock recommendations of all U.S. firms in the period of September 
2002 to December 2009.  The source for the analyst recommendations, earnings forecasts and LTG 
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projections in this study is the IBES database.  The data on firm characteristics are from 
COMPUSTAT.  We obtain stock returns from CRSP, and equity offerings data from SDC. Industry 
membership is inferred through the industry classification defined by the General Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
We manually collect data on the benchmarks used by brokers that issued at least 100 
recommendations during our sample period. There are 249,459 recommendations issued by all 
brokers during our sample period for U.S. firms, out of which 234,274 are issued by brokers with at 
least 100 recommendations. Therefore, the threshold of 100 recommendations enables us to 
concentrate our effort on collecting benchmark data of large brokers without significant loss of 
recommendation data.   
We start by examining the disclosures of analysts regarding the meaning of their firm 
recommendations. We collect disclosures from three sources.  First, we retrieve information from 
full-text research reports in the Investext database.  Under regulations NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE 
Rule 472, which were adopted prior to the beginning of our sample period, analysts are required to 
disclose the exact meaning of their recommendations inside their reports. Analysts normally 
disclose the information on the ratings system, ratings distribution, and the meaning of different 
ratings in the last section of their reports.  Secondly, we collect data from the Investars website,
3
 
which contains the ratings definitions of some brokers.  Finally, if necessary, we obtain data directly 
from brokers’ websites.    
< Insert Table 1 here > 
We rely on the analysts’ disclosures to identify the benchmark they use to define their 
recommendations.  We categorize brokers into ten different types of benchmarks. Table 1 
summarizes these benchmarks and gives examples of textual descriptions from the analysts’ 
disclosures. The three most basic benchmarks involve determining recommendations according to 
the expected performance of the covered stock compared to the performance of industry peers, the 
performance of the market, or to some return threshold. More formally, we classify brokers as 
industry benchmarkers if they state that their stock recommendations are benchmarked against 
industry performance.  For example, Smith Barney’s analysts rate stocks based on the“stock’s 
performance vs. the analyst's industry coverage for the coming 12-18 months.” We classify brokers 
                                                          
3
 http://www2.investars.com/synopsis.asp 
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as market benchmarkers if they state that their stock recommendations are benchmarked against 
market performance.  For example, Wachovia’s analysts rate a stock based its expected 
performance “relative to the market over the next 12 months.” Finally, we classify brokers as total 
return benchmarkers if they issue recommendations based on a stock’s expected total return.  This is 
the case, for example, with Deutsche Bank, where a ‘buy’ recommendation means that the stock’s 
total return is “expected to appreciate 10% or more over a 12-month period.”  
Occasionally brokers determine their recommendations using some combination of these 
three basic benchmarks. We identify four such combinations. For example, Dougherty & Co 
combines features of market and industry benchmarks, so that its ‘buy’ means the corresponding 
stock is “expected to outperform the broader market and/or its sector.” We categorize this broker as 
a market/industry benchmarker. Other hybrids we identify are total/market, industry/total, and 
market/industry/total. 
Other brokers refine the basic benchmarks by adding a risk-adjustment feature. For example, 
Morgan Stanley establishes its recommendations based on the “stocks’s total return vs. analyst’s 
coverage on a risk-adjusted basis.” Notably, the nature of the adjustment for risk is often vague. In 
order to highlight this feature, we add a new category and classify Morgan Stanley as a industry/risk 
benchmarker. Similarly, we classify a broker as market/risk (total/risk) when the benchmark 
involves comparing the stock’s expected performance to the market (a total threshold) on some type 
of risk-adjusted measure.  
We also notice some brokers who changed their benchmarks during our sample period. For 
example, Merrill Lynch used a total benchmark between September 2002 and May 2008, and a 
industry/total benchmark since June 2008. In this case, we classify Merrill Lynch as a total 
benchmarker between September 2002 and May 2008, and as a industry/total benchmarker between 
June 2008 and December 2009. However, for some brokers, we failed to identify the exact date of 
the change.  We classify such instances as a “Changes” category. Finally, some brokers could not be 
classified in any of the above categories, either because we could not find any data on their 
analysts’ disclosures or because their disclosures did not fall into any of the above categories. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
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Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the different benchmarks.
4
 There are 37 
brokers that use the industry benchmark during our sample period, and the number of 
recommendations issued by such brokers accounts for about 33% of all recommendations. The 
number of brokers relying on a market benchmark is 34, and those brokers issued about 18% of all 
recommendations. There are 43 brokers that base their recommendations on a total return 
benchmark, and as a group they issued about 23% of all recommendations. The relevance of these 
basic benchmarks is apparent also when one looks at the size of each broker: Among the twenty 
largest brokers (according to the number of recommendations issued during our sample period), 
nine brokers use a industry benchmark, three brokers use market benchmark, and four brokers use 
total return benchmark. 
Brokers using risk-adjusted benchmarks are usually big brokers, as revealed by the average 
number of recommendations issued by brokers in each category (Morgan Stanley is one such case), 
but there are relatively few of them. Therefore, as a group, these brokers account for just 11% of 
recommendations. Similarly, there are few brokers combining the basic benchmarks. Finally, we 
fail to collect data on benchmarks for 41 brokers, but these brokers are relatively small (with an 
average number of recommendations of 408 during the sample period), and as a group they issued 
about seven percent of recommendations in our sample.   
In this paper we focus our attention on the three basic benchmarks. Three reasons drive our 
choice. First, we want to address a set of benchmarks that is representative of the universe of 
brokers. Industry, market, and total return benchmarkers thoroughly satisfy this requirement: 
together they account for about 74% of the recommendations in our sample period, and they are 
adopted by 16 of the 20 largest brokers.  Second, we need to address benchmarks that have a 
straightforward interpretation, so that clear testable hypotheses can be developed. This requirement 
again favors the three basic benchmarks, as they are the most precisely defined, particularly when 
compared to the risk-adjusted benchmarks (which do not properly document the meaning of their 
risk-adjustment feature) or to the benchmarks that combine more than one basic benchmark. 
Finally, the basic benchmarks allow for an intuitive mapping of the sets of abilities (among stock 
picking, industry picking and market timing) to the type of benchmarks.  
                                                          
4
 Overall, there are 173 brokers with at least 100 recommendations issued during the sample period, and 10 of them 
change their benchmarks during our sample period. Therefore, the total number of brokers in panel A of Table 2 is 183. 
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3 Preliminary Analysis 
3.1 Benchmark Determinants 
The analysts’ disclosures document that different brokerage houses rely on different 
benchmarks. One obvious question is why. Analysts we have interviewed hinted at a tension about 
which benchmark should be used. Some analysts suggest that using an industry benchmark fits well 
with the structure of research departments in brokerage houses, where analysts work in industry 
groups and are deemed industry specialists (e.g., Boni and Womack, 2006; Kadan et al., 2012). 
Some analysts also pointed out that ranking firms within an industry arises directly from application 
of techniques such as comparables. 
Others expressed preference towards a total benchmark, given that a total return expectation 
is a direct product of applying a discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology. They also argued that an 
expectation about total return, as opposed to the return relative to the industry or to the market, is 
the most useful output from the perspective of investors. Finally, some argued that the market 
benchmark makes sense as well, since it is common practice to evaluate each equity asset relative to 
the market (or a popular index such as the S&P 500).  
To add to this anecdotal evidence and provide some large sample results on the determinants 
of the benchmarks, we explore their possible association with brokers’ characteristics. We estimate 
logistic models for the probability of adopting a certain benchmark. Each observation in these 
models is a broker-year pair, describing the benchmark used by the broker in that particular year.5 
The models presented differ in the definition of the dependent variable.  As explanatory variables 
we use broker and analyst characteristics (age, size, number of industries covered, experience) as 
well as characteristics of the covered firms (size and book-to-market).   
< Insert Table 3 here > 
Table 3 presents the results. Two variables emerge as strong determinants of the choice of 
benchmark. The first is broker size—measured by the number of recommendations issued by a 
broker as a fraction of all recommendations issued during the year. Larger brokers are more likely 
to adopt an industry benchmark as opposed to either market or total benchmarks. It may be that 
large brokers that employ a large number of analysts can allow analysts to focus on a select group 
                                                          
5
 We also estimated similar cross-sectional regressions separately for each year during the sample period. The results 
are similar. 
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of firms in one particular industry, leading to more industry specialization and thereby to industry 
benchmarking. The second determinant is the number of industries covered. A larger number of 
covered industries is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting a market or total benchmark. It 
may be that brokers that follow many industries have a better perspective of the market, and thereby 
are more capable of benchmarking their recommendations to a market or total reference. 
3.2 Benchmark Choice and Industry Concentration 
It is well known that brokers tend to organize their sell-side personnel by industry, with each 
analyst covering firms that are related to each other in terms of industry membership. Boni and 
Womack (2006) report that the average analyst has 76% of her covered firms belonging to one 
single industry, and show that most of the value in firm recommendations comes from ranking firms 
within industries. An industry benchmark comes naturally to this framework. On the other hand, the 
ability to rank firms within industry is not sufficient to render a diagnostic of the firm’s prospects 
when a market or total benchmark is employed. In particular, the use of a market or total benchmark 
implies knowledge of the overall market prospects, which requires expertise that goes beyond the 
industry being covered. For these market and total benchmarkers, thus, industry specialization is 
arguably less relevant. This suggests a potential linkage between the organizational structure of a 
broker and the benchmark it adopts.  
We test for this possibility by comparing industry concentration of the broker’s analysts 
across the different types of benchmarks. We follow Boni and Womack (2006) in measuring 
industry concentration. For each year and each analyst, we first recognize a firm as belonging to the 
analyst’s coverage universe if the firm has received at least one recommendation from the analyst 
during the year and that the firm has an outstanding recommendation from that analyst at the end of 
the year. We then define industry concentration as the fraction of the analyst’s coverage universe 
that belongs to her most covered GICS industry. Thus, for each year and each broker, we have the 
industry concentration measures for the analysts employed by that broker. We then compare the 
measures of analysts’ industry concentration across industry, market, and total benchmarkers.  
< Insert Table 4 here > 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that in fact analysts employed by industry benchmarkers tend to 
concentrate in single industries more than their counterparts employed by market and total 
benchmarkers, though the differences in concentration are relatively small. For example, in 2002 
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the average analyst employed by an industry benchmarker has 80.2% of her covered firms 
belonging to one single industry, compared to 75.3% (76.6%) in the case of an analyst employed by 
a market (total) benchmarker. Given the potential for these averages to be overwhelmed by the 
industry concentration measures of analysts with a small coverage universe (e.g., the minimum 
industry concentration for an analyst covering two firms is 50%), we repeat the analysis restricting 
the sample to analysts having at least 5 firms in her coverage universe. Results (Panel B) are similar 
for this restricted sample.  
The univariate statistics suggest smaller concentration by industry for market and total 
benchmarkers, but they do not corroborate the view that market or total benchmarkers avoid 
concentrating by industry. In fact, the numbers for market and total benchmarkers clearly show they 
also concentrate by industry, just not to the same extent that industry benchmarkers do. Moreover, 
these differences might be an artifact of the brokers’ and analysts’ characteristics. For example, 
smaller brokers might have a weaker ability to concentrate. If market benchmakers are smaller, then 
we could see less concentration due to broker size. The size of the analyst’s coverage universe can 
also mechanically affect the measure of industry concentration, given that the number of firms in a 
single industry is finite.
6
 It is also possible that experience correlates with concentration, because 
recently hired analysts might be given a relatively easier task of covering firms that are similar to 
each other. 
To control for these confounding factors, we examine the relationship between the analyst’s 
industry concentration and the benchmark adopted by its employer in a regression setup. We run 
yearly regressions where the data points are analysts for which we were able to collect industry 
concentration measures. The main variable of interest is a dummy for whether the analyst’s broker 
uses an industry benchmark. As control variables, we use the “size” of the broker (the log of the 
number of analysts employed by the broker), the analyst coverage universe (proxied by the log of 
the number of firms in her coverage universe) and analyst experience (proxied by the log of number 
of days since the analyst first entered the IBES dataset).  
The results, reported in Panel B of Table 4, confirm that brokers employing more analysts 
tend to achieve higher levels of industry concentration. As for analysts, a larger coverage universe 
                                                          
6
 Take two analysts who focus mostly on a GICS composed of 30 firms. If one such analyst is covering more than 30 
firms, her industry concentration is bound to be lower than 100%; if the other analyst covers fewer than 30 firms, that it 
is possible to have an industry concentration of 100%. 
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and more years of experience are associated with less industry concentration. Finally, the relevance 
of the association between the adoption of an industry benchmark by a broker and the 
corresponding industry concentration of its analysts is severely diminished in a multivariate setting, 
with the coefficient of the industry dummy significant at the 5% level in only 3 out of 8 regression 
years. If we further restrict the sample to the analysts with a minimum coverage universe of 5 firms, 
no such coefficient is significant. Therefore, while analysts employed by industry benchmarkers do 
present a slightly higher industry concentration, this has more to do with brokers and analysts’ 
characteristics, rather than the benchmark adopted by the broker. 
3.3 Benchmark Choice and Distribution of Recommendations 
Next we examine whether the choice of the benchmark is associated with the characteristics 
of the recommendations issued by a broker. Table 5 and Figure 1 report the distribution of 
recommendations broken down by the benchmark adopted by the broker. The table demonstrates an 
important and salient feature that distinguishes the behavior of industry benchmarkers from market 
and total benchmarkers: Industry benchmarkers tend to be less optimistic. Average recommendation 
levels from industry benchmarkers are significantly higher as compared to the average 
recommendation from market and total benchmarkers.
7
 Moreover, for each year during our sample 
period industry benchmarkers show a smaller proportion of optimistic recommendations and a 
larger proportion of pessimistic recommendations compared to market or total benchmarkers. The 
gap between industry vs. market and total benchmarkers has diminished over the years, especially 
due to the industry benchmarkers reducing their share of pessimistic recommendations, but it is still 
significant at the end of the sample. Notably, market and total benchmarkers behave very similarly, 
especially with respect to the issuance of pessimistic recommendations.    
< Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 here > 
Table 6 further explores the relation between benchmark choice and broker optimism in a 
multivariate setting. We use firm fixed-effects logistic regressions including all recommendations 
during our sample period. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one when the 
recommendation is optimistic in model (1) and pessimistic in model (2). Given the similarity in the 
distribution of recommendations from market and total benchmarkers, we compare these two 
                                                          
7
 In the computation of the average recommendation, ‘strong buys’ and ‘buys’ are mapped to level 1, ‘holds’ are 
mapped to level 2, and ‘sells’ and ‘strong sells’ are mapped to level 3. 
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benchmarks, as a group, with the industry benchmarkers. Our main explanatory variable is an 
indicator for benchmark adopted by the broker issuing the recommendation: It is equal to one if the 
broker is an industry benchmarker and zero otherwise.   
< Insert Table 6 here > 
The choice of which control variables to adopt is made easier by the firm fixed-effects 
specification, since it frees us from having to include firm characteristics that are not varying over 
time. So, instead, we focus on some broker characteristics and time-varying aspects that have been 
shown in prior studies to affect the optimism of brokers.   There is a long literature relating conflicts 
of interest stemming from the relationship between investment banking and sell-side research to the 
optimism in analyst recommendations (e.g., Lin and McNichols,1998; Michaely and Womack, 
1999). We use a broker affiliation dummy to proxy for such conflicts of interest.  The affiliation 
dummy variable is equal to one if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter or 
a co-manager in an equity offering for the firm in the 24 months before the recommendation 
announcement date.  We also control for past market and firm performance, based on the evidence 
that analysts chase momentum (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004), and for broker and 
analyst characteristics. SANCT is an indicator equal to one if the recommendation is issued by an 
analyst who is employed by a brokerage house that was sanctioned during the Global Settlement 
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2006; Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). 
TIER3 is an indicator variable for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid 
at the time a recommendation is issued (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). Finally, we 
control for the experience of the individual analyst issuing the recommendation. 
The results confirm the univariate inferences in Table 5, showing that the benchmarking 
decision is strongly associated with the bullishness of the recommendations. Industry benchmarkers 
are less likely to issue optimistic recommendations and more likely to issue pessimistic 
recommendations as compared to market and total benchmarkers.
8
  
                                                          
8
 One way to reinforce the association between a broker’s benchmark and the distribution of the broker’s 
recommendations is to look at instances where a broker changes its benchmark. We identify four events where both the 
old and the new benchmark are one of the three basic benchmarks analyzed here.  In two of them (both changes from 
total to industry benchmarker), no significant change in the distribution of recommendations follows the change in 
benchmark. In the other two, though, there is a significant increase in the fraction of ‘sell’ recommendations around the 
event of change in benchmark: a jump from 5% to 12% in the case of a change from market to industry benchmarker, 
and from 3% to 17% in the case of a change from total to industry benchmarker. 
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It is documented that analysts have a tendency to be overly optimistic for the subjects they 
cover (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). One possible explanation for this optimism is that 
analysts become attached to the subjects of their coverage—be it firms or industries. Since industry 
benchmarkers rank firms within their industry, their firm recommendations suffer from only one 
source of optimism: their attachment to the firms they cover. By contrast, market and total 
benchmarkers incorporate both their firm and industry views into their firm recommendations. 
Hence, their firm recommendations might suffer from two sources of optimism. As a result, the 
distribution of recommendations coming from market and total benchmarkers is tilted toward 
optimism when compared to that of industry benchmarkers. 
4 Do Analysts Abide by their Benchmarks when Issuing Recommendations? 
That an analyst asserts that her recommendation advice should be interpreted according to 
some specific benchmark does not imply that the benchmark is actually used when the advice is 
determined. In fact, the common structure of research departments along industry groups raises the 
possibility that all analysts determine their recommendation advice through the ranking of their 
coverage universe regardless of the stated benchmark. That is, recommendations could be based on 
stock picking ability alone. In this section, we empirically examine whether benchmarks are 
relevant to the way recommendations are formed. In particular, we examine whether, and to what 
extent, the different abilities—stock picking, industry picking and market timing—associated with 
each benchmark are used by the analysts when they determine their recommendations. Answering 
this question is important both for validating the analysts’ disclosures and for better interpreting 
stock recommendations.  
4.1 Stock Picking vs Industry Picking 
What are the implications of the proper usage of each benchmark with respect to the stock 
picking and industry picking abilities? Consider first analysts declaring the use of an industry 
benchmark. According to their disclosures, stock recommendations are statements about the 
analysts’ expectations on how stocks will perform relative to their industry peers; that is, these 
analysts rely on stock picking but not on industry picking. By contrast, market and total 
benchmarkers would determine their recommendations by relying on their expectations of both the 
firm performance relative to the industry (stock picking) and the industry’s overall performance 
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relative to the market (industry picking). The challenge is that the analyst’s expectations about these 
different components are unobservable. For example, when a market benchmarker issues a buy, 
stating that she expects the stock to outperform the market, we do not know her true expectation of 
the firm performance relative to the industry or her expectation of the industry performance relative 
to the market.  
However, some measures of analysts’ expectations are observable. Besides issuing 
recommendations, analysts also consistently release forecasts about the firm’s upcoming earnings 
and about the firm’s long-term growth (LTG). Our strategy is thus to rely on the analysts’ revealed 
expectations in order to assess whether benchmarks are in fact used when recommendations are 
formed. In considering the relation between analysts’ recommendations and analysts’ other outputs 
such as earnings and LTG forecasts, we are following a long literature (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004; 
Ertimur, Sunder and Sunder, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2009; Barniv et al., 2009; Brown and Huang, 
2010; Kecskes, Michaely and Womack, 2010). One way to analyze this relation is to regress 
recommendations on measures of analysts’ earnings and LTG forecasts. A typical model looks like 
            
(1)                                                             ,P/ELTGRec P/ELTG0   
where Rec is an integer mapping the recommendation levels—for example, ‘optimistic‘ 
recommendations are mapped to 1, ‘neutral’ to 2,  and ‘pessimistic’ to ‘3’. The independent 
variables are obtained from the analysts’ expectations about LTG and earnings. Given that the 
earnings number is mechanically linked to the number of outstanding shares (and the prevalence of 
the use of comparables techniques by sell-side analysts when analyzing companies), the earnings-
price ratio is used instead of the raw measure of earnings per share estimates. To avoid extreme 
values in the independent variables, researchers use rankings of the LTG and E/P measures, where 
values are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The results in the literature show that the coefficients βLTG 
and βE/P are negative: higher expectations about LTG and forward earnings-price ratios are 
associated with lower levels of—that is, more optimistic—recommendations.9 
                                                          
9
 LTG and price-earnings ratios are just two examples of “valuation” proxies based on analysts’ estimates that can be 
used in a regression model to explain recommendations. Other proxies have been explored in the literature, such as the 
residual income valuation model analyzed by Bradshaw (2004). We focus on the LTG and price-earnings proxies in this 
study for two reasons. They are the simplest and most parsimonious proxies (other proxies such as the residual income 
depend on further assumptions for their estimation) and their associations with recommendation levels are the most 
robust across the studies relating recommendations and other outputs from sell-side analysts. 
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The model above needs to be revamped if brokers rely on different benchmarks when 
determining their recommendations. To see this point, consider industry benchmarkers. For these 
brokers, while recommendations are just a ranking relative to industry peers, expectations about 
earnings-price ratios and LTG are by nature absolute, and do not immediately translate into an 
industry ranking. There is, thus, an inconsistency between the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand 
side (RHS) variables: the LHS variable, the recommendation, is industry-adjusted while the RHS 
variables are not.  
We aim at extending model (1) in a way that will capture both within- and across-industry 
relative expectations. To see the idea, suppose we have the analyst’s expectations about (i) how the 
firm’s LTG compares with the LTG of its peers in the industry (“within-industry” LTG 
expectation); and (ii) how the LTG of its industry compares to the LTG of the other industries 
(“across-industry” LTG expectation). Within-industry expectation is relevant for stock picking and 
across-industry expectation matters for industry picking. Thus a market or total benchmarker will 
rely on both expectations when determining her recommendation advice, while an industry 
benchmarker will mostly (or totally) rely on the first component. In other words, all brokers 
(industry, market, or total benchmarkers) would “load” on their within-industry expectations, but 
industry benchmarkers would not load (or at least load less) on the across-industry expectations 
when compared to market and total benchmarkers.  
We do not observe the within-industry and across-industry expectations directly, but we can 
infer them from the raw forecasts issued by the analysts. More specifically, we decompose analysts’ 
expectations of LTG and earnings into an across-industry (AI) and within-industry (WI) 
components as follows. Starting with the LTG forecasts, each month we first compute for each firm 
the consensus LTG as the average LTG forecast amongst the outstanding forecasts available for that 
firm.
 
In the next step, we define for each industry an industry LTG forecast as the average LTG 
consensus across all firms in that industry. Then, for each firm in that month we compute the firm’s 
industry-adjusted LTG forecast as the firm’s LTG forecast minus its industry LTG forecast. We 
assign each firm a score between 0 and 1 based on the ranking of industry-adjusted LTG forecasts 
in each industry. We denote this score by WI_LTG. For each firm we also calculate an across-
industry LTG score based on the ranking of its industry LTG forecasts among all industries. The 
latter is denoted AI_LTG. Similarly, we calculate a within- and across-industry earnings estimate 
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rankings denoted by WI_E/P and AI_E/P respectively, based on the analyst earnings forecast scaled 
by the stock price prevailing when the earnings data are collected.
10
  
We then estimate the following model: 
    
(2)         ,P/E_WIP/E_AILTG_WILTG_AIRec P/E_WIP/E_AILTG_WILTG_AI0   
where Rec takes the value of 1, 2, or 3 for “optimistic,” “neutral,” and “pessimistic,” respectively.11 
In line with the prior literature we expect all the coefficients to be negative. More relevant for our 
focus, we run these models separately for industry and market or total benchmarkers. We then 
expect βAI_LTG and βAI_E/P for market and total benchmarkers to be more negative than the 
corresponding coefficients for industry benchmarkers.  
< Insert Table 7 here > 
We estimate models (1) and (2) using monthly regressions. The results are reported in Table 
7. The table shows the Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) style coefficients from averaging the monthly 
regressions from September 2002 through December 2009, where the standard errors for the mean 
coefficients are adjusted for autocorrelation (see, for example, Loughran and Schultz; 2005; Fama 
and French, 2002).  Specifications (i) and and (ii) in Table 7 show estimates of model (1), the one 
traditionally pursued in the literature, by which LTG and E/P are not broken into within- and across-
industry components. As expected, the coefficients are significantly negative for both industry and 
non-industry (market or total) benchmarkers, reflecting that better views on the earnings of the 
company do translate on average into a more favorable recommendation.  
In specifications (iii) and (iv) we estimate model (2) separately for industry and for market 
and total benchmarkers. We also estimate a model on a pooled sample that allows us to compare the 
coefficients related to different benchmarks (using appropriate dummy variables). The results show 
that both within- and across-industry expectations are incorporated into the recommendations of 
both analyst types as all the coefficients are negative. Notice, however, that the loadings on across-
                                                          
10
 We use unadjusted measures of forecasts of 1-year ahead earnings. Forecasts that are older than 12 months are 
deleted. Results are robust to using 2-year ahead projections, and to relaxing the 12-months limit on the outstanding 
measures.  
11
 Optimistic refer to ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy’ recommendations; neutral refer to ‘hold’ recommendations; and pessimistic 
refer to ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell’ recommendations. This 3-tier mapping differs from the usual 5-tier mapping adopted by 
the literature. The change is motivated by the sample period of our study. After 2002 (the period of our study), most of 
the brokers have adopted a three-tier rating system. The qualitative inferences reported here are robust to mapping the 
recommendations into a range of 1 through 5 (from ‘strong buy’ to ‘strong sell’, respectively). 
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industry expectations are significantly higher in absolute value for market and total benchmarkers 
compared to industry benchmarkers (0.264 vs. 0.183 for LTG and 0.107 vs. 0.032 for E/P, both 
different at the 1% level). This suggests that market and total benchmarkers put more weight on 
across-industry expectations when issuing recommendations compared to industry benchmarkers. 
By contrast, we do not find a significant difference in coefficients of the within-industry measures 
of expectations for LTG and E/P, suggesting that all brokers take this information into account to a 
similar degree when issuing recommendations.
12
 
These results support the hypothesis that market and total benchmarkers do behave 
differently from industry benchmarkers in how they use expectations about the firms’ fundamentals 
when determining their recommendations. Industry benchmarkers mostly rely on the ranking of a 
firm’s fundamentals within its industry (though they also use the across-industry expectation of 
LTG). Market and total benchmarkers, while also ranking firms within industry, use their 
expectations about the firm’s industry performance as compared to the other industries to a larger 
degree than industry benchmarkers. In other words, stock picking is practiced by all types of 
benchmarkers, and industry picking matters more for market and total benchmarkers when 
compared to industry benchmarkers. This behavior is consistent with the stated benchmark in the 
analysts’ disclosures.13  
4.2 Market Timing 
A recommendation from a market benchmarker—a measure of the expected return of a firm 
relative to the market—can be seen as a statement about how the firm will perform relative to its 
industry (stock picking) plus how its industry will perform relative to the market (industry picking). 
A recommendation from a total benchmarker—a measure of the firm’s expected  absolute return—
                                                          
12
 A natural concern is that the firms covered by industry and market benchmarkers are fundamentally different, and 
hence the results we uncover are driven by differences in the characteristics of the covered firms, rather than by the 
adopted benchmark. To address this issue we repeat the analysis in Table 7 for a subsample of firms that are covered by 
both industry and market/total benchmarkers. The results of this analysis are very similar to those reported in Table 7 
(and available upon request). 
13
 This methodology also sheds some light on why market and total benchmarkers are in general more optimistic than 
industry benchmarkers. If it was only for the within-industry expectation of the firm’s fundamentals, brokers with 
different benchmarks would be similar in the optimism presented in their recommendations. It is the extra loading on 
the analysts’ expectations about how the fundamentals of the firm’s industry compare to the fundamentals of the other 
industries that distinguishes market and total benchmarkers from the industry benchmarkers. If you take two analysts 
having the same relative expectations about the firms and their industries fundamentals, the analyst that works based on 
a market or total benchmark becomes more optimistic compared to an industry benchmarker because she puts extra 
weights on the across-industry dimensions of her expectations. (This interpretation is made easier given that RHS 
variables are normalized between 0 and 1.)  
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in turn can be interpreted as a statement about how the firm will perform relative to its industry 
(stock picking) plus how the industry will perform relative to the market (industry picking) plus 
how the market will perform (market timing). Thus, what distinguishes a total from a market 
benchmarker is the total benchmark’s reliance on market timing.  
We can then examine whether total benchmarkers abide by their benchmark and use market 
timing by comparing their recommendations with the recommendations from market benchmarkers. 
A starting point in testing for market timing in recommendations is to compare the 
recommendations’ optimism with a proxy for expectations about market performance. Successful 
market timing would entail being more optimistic (pessimistic) when the market is expected to 
perform well (poorly), for example during expansions (recessions).  Figure 1 shows, for example, 
that all types of benchmarkers decrease their overall optimism (measured by either a decreasing 
proportion of buys or an increasing proportion of sells) as the 2007-2009 recession develops.  
However, overall optimism cannot be necessarily linked to market timing. For both market 
and total benchmarkers, optimism can also originate from the other skills—stock picking and 
industry picking—employed by these analysts. Therefore, we need to isolate optimism that is linked 
to market timing. For that, we extract the degree of optimism in recommendations after netting out 
the effects of stock picking and industry picking. Recall that the regression model (2) above 
explicitly incorporates the effects of stock picking and industry picking in shaping 
recommendations. In that model, we can interpret the intercept β0 as capturing the general level of 
optimism that is not due to neither stock picking nor industry picking. In fact, it is more appropriate 
to interpret the intercept as capturing the pessimism in recommendations; Given that the LHS 
variable in model (2) takes values from 1 (optimistic recommendation) to 3 (pessimistic 
recommendation), higher values of the intercept are associated with more pessimistic 
recommendations.  
We estimate model (2) separately for total and for market benchmarkers. The difference 
between their corresponding intercepts, (β0,Total - β0,Market), is the estimate of the difference in 
unexplained pessimism (that is, pessimism that is not originating from stock picking or industry 
picking abilities) between total benchmarkers and market benchmarkers.
14
 We refer to this 
                                                          
14
 We combine the two estimations in one single regression, by pooling data from both market and total benchmarkers 
and interacting each coefficient with a “Total” dummy for the recommendations coming from total benchmarkers. The 
interaction of the intercept with the “Total” dummy is the estimate for the (β0,Total -  β0,Market).  
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difference as ‘excess pessimism’ throughout the discussion. Model (2) is estimated monthly, 
yielding a time-series of monthly estimates of ‘excess pessimism’. To test for market timing, we 
then compare this ‘excess pessimism’ with a proxy for expectations about market performance. For 
this proxy, we adopt the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). According to the Chicago 
Federal Reserve, the CFNAI “is a monthly index designed to gauge overall economic activity and 
related inflationary pressure.”15 The idea is that analysts would have a direct way to assess the 
overall state of the economy and, to the extent that market performance correlates with economic 
activity, analysts could rely on CFNAI to adjust their expectations about market performance. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
Figure 2 shows monthly estimates of (β0,Total - β0,Market) and the CFNAI. While for roughly 
the first half of our sample period no clear pattern emerges regarding comovements between ‘excess 
pessimism’ and CFNAI, a strong negative correlation between these measures emerges during the 
later part of the sample, particularly during the 2007-2009 recession. There, we see CFNAI 
collapsing and the ‘excess pessimism’ booming. Formal statistical tests confirm the visual pattern. 
The overall correlation between ‘excess pessimism’ and CFNAI is -0.11 (t-stats=-2.90), though the 
bigger effect is in the 2
nd
 half of the sample: the correlation for the first half of the sample is not 
significantly different from zero, while for the second half it stands at -0.60 (t-stats=-5.14). This is 
evidence consistent with the idea that total benchmarkers rely more on market timing than market 
benchmarkers. They become significantly more pessimistic than market benchmarkers during a 
recession, and this is not because of stock picking or industry picking.
16
 
                                                          
15
 The monthly index is a weighted-average of 85 monthly indicators published by the Chicago Fed. The index is 
designed to have an average value of zero and standard deviation of one. Values above (below) zero indicate economic 
growth above (below) trend. See http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/cfnai/index.cfm for more 
information. 
16
 Two caveats are in order. The first is power. Given that we rely on monthly measures of (β0,Total - β0,Market) and 
CFNAI, our inferences are based on only 88 data points. Second, we are assuming that the analyst’s expectation of 
market performance is captured by the CFNAI measure. CFNAI measures current economic activity, but what the 
analyst incorporates in the stock recommendation advice is her expectation of market return over the next year. It is 
possible that the analyst gets her expectations from other sources. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the analyst—or any 
type of financial expert—would ignore the economic indicators when attempting to assess market performance. (During 
our sample period, for example, the CFNAI and the market return have a significant positive correlation of 0.40.) This is 
particularly true during what has been named the “great recession.” It is hard to make a case that analysts would be 
bullish about the market during the harsh economic times (as indicated by the CFNAI) between 2007 and 2009.   
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5 The Performance of Recommendations and How They Reflect Analysts’ Abilities 
5.1 General  
The results in the previous section suggest that analysts do indeed take the different 
benchmarks into account when issuing their recommendations. Different benchmarks imply 
different objectives for recommendations. For industry benchmarkers the objective is to beat the 
industry peers; for market benchmarkers it means beating the market; and for total benchmarkers it 
means beating some absolute threshold.
 
In this section, we analyze the performance of analysts 
based on whether the recommended stocks behave “as promised” in the analysts’ disclosures, 
meeting or beating their declared objective. If performance does exist, we then explore its sources. 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
In order to ascertain whether the recommendation’s objective is achieved, we first take a 
closer look at how analysts state their objectives. Besides the benchmark, the recommendation’s 
objective (or, its literal meaning) carries a target threshold as well, and this threshold varies across 
brokers. For example, in the case of a ‘buy’, some analysts may expect the recommended stock 
return to surpass the benchmark return by 10%, while others may require a 5% outperformance.
17
 
Table 8 presents summary statistics of the target thresholds used by the brokers in our sample. Panel 
A shows the thresholds used by market benchmarkers. The most frequent target is zero, saying that 
a typical ‘buy’ recommendation issued by a market benchmarker means that the recommended 
stock’s return will exceed the market return over the forecast horizon. This threshold is used by 20 
out of the 34 market benchmarkers in our sample. Panel B shows that for industry benchmarkers the 
most common threshold is also zero, which corresponds to the expectation that the stock’s return of 
a buy recommendation exceeds the industry return over the forecast horizon. Finally, Panel C 
presents the threshold distribution for total benchmarkers. Here, the most prevalent threshold is 
15%, which corresponds to the expectation that the total return of a stock with a buy 
recommendation over the forecasted horizon should be at least 15%. Though, notably, in this case 
targets of 10% or 20% are also quite popular.  Target thresholds for ‘sell’ recommendations are 
typically symmetric, and are not reported for brevity. 
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 The literal meaning of the recommendation also includes the forecast horizon: how long should it take for the 
recommendation prediction to materialize. In this case, though, a very common trend emerges, with the vast majority of 
the brokers working on a 12-month horizon. In a few cases, the broker adopts a range for its forecast horizon (for 
example, saying that the recommendation is based on the “stock's performance vs. the analyst's industry coverage for 
the coming 12-18 months”), though in these situations the 12-months period tends to be part of the declared range. 
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5.2 Methodology  
We evaluate whether the recommendation’s objective has been achieved in two ways. In the 
first approach, we simply compare the performance of the recommendation to its stated objective, 
as follows: (i) If the recommendation has not been changed for a year, we compare the cumulative 
stock return during the year to the stated objective; (ii) If the recommendation advice has been 
changed within 12 months after it was issued (e.g., through a cancelation or an 
upgrade/downgrade), we compare the cumulative stock return until the end of the day when the 
recommendation was changed to the stated objective. We thus refer to the target date of a 
recommendation as the earlier of 12 months and the date in which the recommendation advice has 
been revoked.
18
 Under this approach, we follow the literal meaning of the recommendation’s stated 
objective, without accounting for risk. This is consistent with how the analysts’ employers and the 
institutional investors most often judge recommendations’ performance. 19   
In the second approach, we also consider the risk profile of stock recommendations. We 
want to isolate any performance that is associated with loadings on risk factors, and only measure 
performance that is due to some key insights offered by the analysts. To do so, we match each 
recommendation (a firm i that receives a ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ at time t) to a control unit (another firm ic 
and another time period tc) such that firm i at time t and ic at time tc have a similar risk profile based 
on the four Fama-French factors: beta, size, book-to-market and momentum. The matching 
procedure is based on the nearest neighbor matching of propensity scores (Rosembaum and Rubin, 
1983). The propensity score matching procedure has the appealing feature of solving the problem of 
the “curse of dimensionality” that appears when matches over multiple dimensions are required, and 
has been used in many different corporate finance settings (e.g., Bharath et al., forthcoming; 
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 In other words, a recommendation is evaluated throughout its stated life span as long as its advice is still outstanding. 
This definition of the life span of a recommendation is similar to the approach used in the literature when examining the 
investment value of recommendations. When forming portfolio based on recommendations, stocks are included in a 
portfolio when a new recommendation appears, and the stock in kept in the portfolio until the earlier date between (1) 
the end of the stated life span of the recommendation and (2) the date when the recommendation advice is revoked. See, 
for example, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) and Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). 
19
 Conversations with sell-side analysts indicated that the benchmarks are in fact used internally by the brokers when 
assessing the performance of their analysts. A recent article in the press reinforces the view that analysts do want their 
recommendations to be interpreted relative to the adopted benchmarks. The article discusses Credit Suisse decision to 
switch to an industry benchmark, an event that was accompanied by some reshuffling of their outstanding 
recommendation. In explaining why Hess Corp. was downgraded, its analyst wrote that Hess “could still outperform the 
broader market. However, Hess spent more on energy exploration and development than expected this year, so that 
could prove a drag on its results relative to its peers.” See “Credit Suisse: These Downgrades Aren’t Personal,” The 
Wall Street Journal, October 2
nd
, 2012. 
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Drucker and Puri, 2005; Villalonga, 2004; Colak and Whited, 2007; Hellman, Lindsey and Puri, 
2008). We provide more details of the matching procedure in Appendix A.  
5.3 Results 
Panel A of Table 9 presents the fraction of ‘buy’/’sell’ recommendations that meet their 
stated objective. We show this success rate broken down by the three different benchmarks, and we 
report the results separately for the actual recommendations and for their control units. The results 
indicate that about 50% of buy recommendations issued by industry and market benchmarkers meet 
or beat their objective. By contrast, less than 40% of buy recommendations issued by total 
benchmarkers do so. These results seem plausible, as meeting the objective for total benchmarkers 
is arguably a harder task. First, total benchmarkers need to base their advice on predictions related 
to firm-specific returns, industry returns and market returns. Second, total benchmarkers tend to rely 
on higher targets thresholds (about 15%) than industry and market benchmarkers (about 0%).  
Next, we consider whether the success rate for ‘buy’ recommendations is related to the 
recommendation itself or is driven by either risk characteristics or more stringent objectives.
 20
 To 
do that, we compare the success rates between the actual recommendations and the control units 
obtained from the propensity score matching procedure. The comparison suggests that for all types 
of benchmarks, firms for which analysts issue ‘buy’ recommendations perform better than firms 
with similar risk characteristics that did not receive such recommendations.
21
 For example, 49.6% 
of buy recommendations issued by industry benchmarkers hit their targets, compared with 42.8% of 
control units. Also, it is worth noting that while recommendations issued by total benchmarkers 
underperform those that were issued by market or industry benchmarkers, they perform much better 
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 To illustrate the first possibility, take two analysts, A and B, working for the same broker (let’s say a market 
benchmarker). Analyst A covers large company stocks and B covers small company stocks. Assume each analyst 
randomly issues ‘buys’ for the stocks within their coverage set, without trying to add any insight. If size is indeed a risk 
factor—such that large (small) companies on average underperform (underperform) the market—then the ‘buys’ from A 
will underperform her stated objective while ‘buys’ from B will overperform it, but the performance difference is not 
due any special insight being offered by neither analyst (other than different loadings on risk factors). For the second 
possbility, now take analysts A and B working for different brokers, but issuing exactly the same ‘buys’ to the same 
firms. Assume that analyst A’s employer adopts a higher target return, and thus a higher stated objective, compared to 
B’s employer. In the measure of  recommendation performance—the return of recommended firm minus the stated 
objective—the first term is the same for analysts A and B, while the second term is higher for analyst A. Thus, analyst B 
performs better than A but, again, not due to any specific insight (other than having chosen to work for a less demanding 
broker!).  
21
 Recall that we measure the performance of a recommendation over the period during which it was active, or over one 
year, whichever is shorter. For the control unit, we measure performance over the same length period that we used for 
its corresponding actual recommendation. In addition, for the control unit, we adopt the same stated objective as the one 
used by the corresponding recommendation.  
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than their control units (38.9% vs. 31.2%). The results for ‘sell’ recommendations are similar. More 
than 58% of ‘sells’ coming from market and industry benchmarkers meet their objective but only 
about 36% of ‘sells’ coming from total benchmarkers do so. In addition, compared to the control 
units, the actual recommendations perform significantly better for all types of benchmarks. 
Moreover, the difference in success rates between actual recommendations and their control units 
for ‘sell’ recommendations is larger than for ‘buy’ recommendations.  
Panel B of Table 9 considers the magnitudes by which analysts beat (or miss) their stated 
objectives. The table reports the average, as well as the median, difference between the realized 
return and the stated objective for each recommendation in our sample as well as for the control 
units. The results are consistent with those in Panel A. Indeed, industry and market benchmarkers 
significantly beat their stated objective for both ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ recommendations. For example, a 
‘buy’ recommendation from an industry benchmarker yields a return that exceeds the stated 
objective (the industry return plus the target) by 293 basis points.
22
 By contrast, total benchmarkers 
on average miss their stated objective. For example, a ‘sell’ recommendation issued by a total 
benchmarker misses the target by 1,136 basis points, on average. To evaluate the performance of 
recommendations relative to the performance of stocks with similar risk characteristics and facing 
the same stated objective, we consider the control units. We find that for all types of benchmarkers, 
the excess returns over the stated objectives for ‘buy’ (‘sell’) recommendations are better (worse) 
than those of the control units.      
< Insert Table 9 here > 
In Panel C we report the raw returns associated with the different stock recommendations 
broken by benchmark type. This analysis focuses on the performance of recommendation abstracted 
from the recommendation’s stated objective. As before, the time period we use is the earliest of 12 
months or until the recommendation has been changed. Notice that the raw returns following ‘buy’ 
recommendations issued by market, industry, and total benchmarkers are not very different from 
each other (10.1%, 11.0%, and 9.9%). More importantly, we see that the better performance of 
‘buys’ and ‘sells’ compared to their control units is also observed in raw returns. Thus, the results 
do not seem to depend on differences in the stated objectives across different benchmarkers.  
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 We report medians to ensure that our inferences are not affected by extreme observations that might have an undue 
influence on the means. This is an important concern when dealing with long term returns. We discuss the results on 
medians whenever they might yield a different inference than that of the means.  
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In an alternative analysis (not reported and available upon request) we perform a 
multivariate analysis of the relation between raw returns and the benchmark type. We regress raw 
returns following the recommendations on benchmark indicators and a set of control variables 
including past firm and market performance to account for momentum, analysts’ experience, broker 
size, firm size, and book-to-market. We also control for the general tendency of a broker to issue 
each type of recommendation. If a broker is in general more stringent with respect to issuing ‘buys’ 
it is likely that its ‘buys’ are more meaningful.23 We follow Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and 
Trueman (2006) and include dummies for the broker’s favorableness quintiles. These quintiles are 
determined each quarter by ranking brokers in ascending order according to the percentage of each 
type of recommendation at the end of the previous quarter.
24
 We include in the regression dummies 
for quintiles 1 (least favorable) through quintile 4 (that is, quintile 5, the most favorable, is the 
baseline to which the other dummies should be compared). Consistent with the results in Panel C of 
Table 9, we not observe a difference between the three groups of benchmarkers. This reinforces our 
interpretation that the difference in abnormal performance of recommendations across different 
benchmarkers comes from the stated objective and not from the returns. 
In sum, the analysis in Table 9 reveals that for all types of benchmarks ‘buy’ (‘sell’) 
recommendations outperform (underperform) stocks with similar risk profiles and subject to the 
same investment objective. Also, it is important to emphasize that the seemingly weak performance 
of recommendations issued by total benchmarkers, relative to those issued by industry and market 
benchmarkers, is a result of a more stringent stated objective.  
In our next analysis, we are interested in identifying the source of value in stock 
recommendations. There are three possible contributors to the performance of stock 
recommendations. First, stock recommendations can reflect analysts’ ability to identify winners and 
                                                          
23
 Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2006) report that indeed the investment value of recommendations 
depends on the overall ‘favorableness’ (or proclivity to issue ‘buys’) of each broker. Given the results in Section 3 that 
the distribution of recommendations differs across different benchmarkers, we also need to control for this 
favorableness here. 
24
 Barber et al (2006) considered favorableness based on fraction of ‘buys’ only, while we separately look at 
favorableness towards ‘buys’ for the regression examining ‘buys’ and favorableness towards ‘sells’ for the regression 
examining ‘sells’. The difference is explained by the sample period of the two studies. For Barber et al (2006), most of 
the data comes from the period before September 2002, when sells were rare, so the vast majority of the 
recommendations were in practice spread between ‘buys’ and ‘hold’, and therefore the favorableness towards ‘buys’ 
would be a good summary of the overall distribution of recommendations for the broker. Our sample period starts in 
September 2002, when recommendations become more balanced between ‘buys’ and ‘sells,’ so a broker’s favorableness 
towards ‘buys’ does not denote necessarily its lack of favorableness towards ‘sells.’ 
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losers within a particular industry (Boni and Womack, 2006). We refer to this dimension as stock 
picking. Second, it is possible that stock recommendations also reflect analysts’ opinions about the 
industry prospects of the firms they cover (Kadan et al, 2012). We refer to this dimension as 
industry picking. Third, stock recommendations could be influenced by the general sentiment of 
analysts towards the market as a whole (market timing).  
The disclosure of recommendations’ benchmarks allows us to better evaluate the three 
dimensions of analysts’ abilities, because each dimension is manifested differently in each 
benchmark type. Industry benchmarkers, who state that their recommendations aim at beating an 
industry threshold, are expected to rely on stock picking ability alone. Market benchmarkers state 
that their recommendations will beat a market threshold. Thus, their recommendations are expected 
to incorporate both stock picking and industry picking abilities. Finally, total benchmarkers present 
an absolute threshold that is influenced by the performance of firms, industries and the market as a 
whole. Thus, we expect recommendations issued by total benchmarkers to reflect all three 
dimensions of analysts’ abilities.  Our objective is to examine whether and how the performance of 
recommendations demonstrate the presence of these three abilities, specially the as yet unexplored 
market timing. Our setting provides us with a cleaner and more powerful test of such ability, as we 
can focus on the unique subset of analysts that claim to rely on it (i.e. total benchmarkers).  
To evaluate the different abilities of analysts, we decompose the returns in excess of the 
recommendations’ stated objective into components that measure stock picking, industry picking 
and market timing. For industry benchmarkers, excess returns only reflect analysts’ stock picking 
and are measured as  
                                       R – (Rindustry + Target).                                      (3) 
For market benchmarkers, we decompose the difference between the actual returns and the 
stated objective into two components,  
R – (Rmarket + Target) = (R-Rindustry)+(Rindustry – (Rmarket + Target)),   (4) 
where the first term on the RHS reflects stock picking and the second term reflects industry picking.  
Finally, for total benchmarkers, we decompose the difference between actual returns and the 
target into components reflecting stock picking, industry picking and market timing abilities,.  
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R – Target = (R-Rindustry)+(Rindustry – Rmarket )+( Rmarket – Target).   (5) 
Similar to the analysis in Table 9, we compare the returns and their components between the 
actual recommendations and their control units. We begin with ‘buy’ recommendations from 
industry benchmarkers, for whom we can only evaluate stock picking ability. We document a 
significant difference between the stock picking component associated with the actual 
recommendations and the one associated with the control units, suggesting that stock picking ability 
exists. (Note that because the stock picking component and the returns in excess of the stated 
objective are equal for industry benchmarkers, the numbers in the top of Table 10 are identical to 
those for industry benchmarkers in Table 9).  
< Insert Table 10 here > 
 When examining market benchmarkers, we can evaluate both stock picking and industry 
picking. We confirm that stock picking is also present, as the returns exceed the industry index by 
521 basis points for the actual recommendations, compared to 135 basis points for the control 
units.
25
 On the other hand, our results do not indicate any industry picking ability, as the industry 
picking components are not significantly different between the actual recommendations and their 
control units (39 basis points compared to 27 basis points).  
Studying total benchmarkers allows us to examine all three possible abilities of analysts. 
Like before, we find stock picking ability, where the difference between actual returns and industry 
returns is 478 basis points for the actual recommendations compared to 102 basis points for the 
control units. We do not find any evidence of industry picking, as the difference between 189 basis 
points for the actual recommendations and 174 basis points for the control units is not significant. 
Finally, we do not find evidence of market timing among total benchmarkers. Market returns 
following ‘buy’ recommendations are not higher than those of the control units. In fact, the average 
difference between market returns and the targets following actual ‘buy’ recommendations is lower 
than that following the control units (-1,153 basis points versus -1,066 basis points), though not 
significantly so when comparing  the medians. Results for ‘sell’ recommendations are very similar. 
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 Notice that the stock picking components in equations (4) and (5) are slightly different due to the way the target 
return is assigned. To compare the stock picking component of industry benchmarkers to that of market benchmarkers, 
one needs to add the weighted average of the targets among ‘buys’ of industry benchmarkers (165 basis points) to their 
average stock picking component of 293 basis points. The difference in computation, however, does not affect the 
inferences from comparing the recommendations and their control units because the returns for each control unit are 
measured in the same way as for the corresponding actual recommendation.   
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Like in the case of ‘buy’ recommendations, we find evidence of stock picking, but not of industry 
picking or market timing.  
Overall, Table 10 provides evidence that analysts possess stock picking ability across all 
three types of benchmarks. The results are consistent with the analysts’ disclosures of their 
investment objectives, as each of the three benchmarks suggests analysts’ reliance on the stock 
picking ability. The evidence is also consistent with prior studies (starting with Boni and Womack, 
2006) that argue that analysts are good in ranking firms within an industry.  
We do not find evidence of industry picking among both market and total benchmarkers. 
This contrasts with their disclosures implying reliance on industry picking. It is worth emphasizing 
that our test for industry picking is a joint test of analysts abiding by their stated benchmark, as well 
as being successful at industry picking. It is possible, for example, that market benchmarkers are, de 
facto, acting like industry benchmarkers, not attempting to provide any industry picking.  If that is 
the case, we obviously would not expect to find any evidence of industry picking. However, our 
results in Table 7 provide evidence that market and total benchmarkers’ recommendations rely more 
on across-industry information, suggesting that these analysts are attempting to abide by their stated 
objective. Thus, we conclude that our results are more likely consistent with analysts not 
demonstrating industry picking ability, as opposed to analysts not attempting to provide industry 
picking. 
It is important to contrast this conclusion with the results of Kadan et al. (2012). In that 
paper, we provide evidence that strategy analysts possess industry picking ability. However, Kadan 
et al. (2012) mostly rely on industry recommendations issued by strategy analysts. In this paper, we 
examine the existence of industry picking in firm recommendations issued by analysts who cover 
individual firms.  Also, in one analysis Kadan et al. (2012) relies on firm recommendations to infer 
industry picking. They present mild evidence of industry picking among market and total 
benchmarkers. In this paper, we rely on a different methodology of analyzing industry picking in 
firm recommendations.
26
  The other important difference is that in Kadan et al. (2012) we examine 
a sample of the twenty largest brokers, while in this paper we examine a more comprehensive 
sample of brokers. In untabulated results we re-examine the analysis of Kadan et al. (2012) on the 
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 For example, in this paper we analyze the performance of a recommendation over its entire life span, while in Kadan 
et al. (2012) we only evaluate performance over a short-term window of one month. In addition, in this paper we control 
for risk through the use of a matched sample, while in Kadan at el. (2012) we use a four-factor alpha.  
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more expanded sample of brokers. The results show no evidence of industry picking among market 
and total benchmarkers in the larger sample.  
As for market timing, we do not find evidence of superior performance by total 
benchmarkers, even as they profess and try to rely on it. As before, we emphasize the joint nature of 
this test. Given the earlier evidence that total benchmarkers do try to incorporate market timing in 
their recommendations, lack of evidence of superior market timing performance is more likely 
consistent with total benchmarkers not demonstrating market timing ability, rather than not 
attempting to do so. Such lack of results might be consistent with the task’s difficulty. The absence 
of market timing ability among sell-side analysts mirrors the inability of other market professionals 
to successfully time the market. These include investment newsletters (see Graham and Harvey, 
1994, 1996, 1997), hedge fund managers (Fung, Xu and Yao, 2002), and pension fund managers 
(Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman, 1993).
27
    
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the literal meaning of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. 
We document that different brokers rely on different benchmarks with respect to which the 
investment advice in each recommendation should be interpreted. For example, a ‘buy’ from a 
market benchmarker is a prediction that the recommended stock is expected to outperform the 
market; a ‘buy’ from an industry benchmarker denotes the analyst’s expectation that the stock will 
outperform its peers in the same industry; finally, a buy from a total benchmarker suggests the stock 
will beat some absolute return threshold. 
We show that these benchmarks are not an irrelevant detail in the analyst’s disclosure about 
how recommendations should be viewed. Instead, such benchmarks are in fact used when analysts 
form their recommendation advice. For example, industry benchmarkers, who profess to basically 
rank firms within each industry, do rely less on across-industry expectations about fundamentals—
such as earnings and LTG projections—when compared to market and total benchmarkers. Also, 
consistent with the assertion in the analysts’ disclosures that total, but not market benchmarkers, 
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 The ability to time the market has also been extensively tested in the context of mutual funds, with mixed results. 
While most of the literature has failed to identify such ability  in mutual funds (e.g., Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; 
Henriksson, 1984; Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Becker, Ferson, Myers and Schill, 1999), 
more recent developments on how market timing is tested do ascribe some positive timing to mutual fund managers 
(Bollen and Busse, 2001; Jiang, Yao, and Yu, 2007). 
31 
 
rely on market timing, we observe that total benchmarkers do become more pessimistic relative to 
market benchmarkers during the recession in our sample period. This suggests that the use of each 
recommendation—by investors or by academics—should take into consideration the benchmark 
under which it is formed.  
We exploit the different benchmarks to better understand the sources of value that are 
reflected in stock recommendations. Each benchmark implies the use of a different set of skills, 
which could include stock picking, industry picking and market timing. We show that stock 
recommendations from all benchmarkers perform better than stocks with similar risk profiles that 
were not issued the same type of recommendation. The improved performance of stock 
recommendations comes solely from stock picking. We find no evidence of industry picking or 
market timing, even for the benchmarkers that imply the use of these abilities.  
Our study suggests that both academics and investors should pay more attention to the 
declared objective of each recommendation. In particular, the fact that different recommendations 
carry different meanings can be used to shed new light on a range of empirical questions. Ramnath, 
Rock, and Shane (2008), for example, advocate the need for a better understanding of how analysts 
operate. The different benchmarkers employed by brokers suggest that information shocks would 
affect recommendations differently depending on the broker’s benchmark—e.g., with industry 
shocks affecting more the recommendations from market and total benchmarkers when compared to 
recommendations from industry benchmarkers.  Another potential area worth of a second look is the 
long literature on how incentives affect bias and performance of recommendations (e.g., Lin and 
McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999). This comes naturally once one recognizes that 
performance is a comparison between the return path of the recommended stock and its stated 
objective, and thus should take into consideration the benchmark adopted by the broker. In fact, 
determining superiority among analysts in terms of their stock picking abilities (e.g., Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis, 2004) might need adjustment as well, given that different analysts arguably 
pick stocks according to different objectives. These are left as avenues for future research. 
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Appendix A. Propensity Score Matching Procedure  
The procedure for matching ‘buys’ is as follows. We estimate a probit model of the 
likelihood that a firm receives a buy recommendation in a particular month. We use a pooled 
sample of the monthly cross-sections of firms trading on NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX between 
September 2002 and December 2009. We rely on the predicted probabilities (the propensity scores) 
from the probit model to find a nearest-neighbor match with replacement for each ‘buy’. A ‘buy’ is 
defined by the firm receiving the recommendation and the recommendation announcement day. In 
the probit model, this ‘buy’ maps to the data point (i,t), corresponding to firm i that received the 
recommendation and to month t during which the recommendation is issued. We define the matched 
unit for (i,t) as the data point (ic,tc) —corresponding to firm ic and month tc—with the propensity 
score that is closest to the propensity score from (i,t).  We also require that firm ic has not received a 
‘buy’ in month tc. Given that the probit model is estimated at the monthly level, the matching 
procedure does not define the day of the month for the matched observation. We assume it to be the 
same day of the month as the original ‘buy’ (or the last day of tc if tc does not have the day of the 
month of the original ‘buy’).28,29 
For explanatory variables in the probit model, we use the risk characteristics associated with 
the Fama-French 4-factor model: beta, size, book-to-market and momentum. There are two 
concerns with using the raw measures of the risk characteristics in the pooled probit model. First, it 
is possible that a time trend in the raw measures would result in weaker matches. For example, if we 
use raw measure of size and the average market capitalization increases over time, a ‘buy’ for a 
relatively large firm in the early part of the sample could be matched to a relatively small firm in the 
late part of the sample. Second, measures like size and book-to-market can be prone to skewness 
and the presence of outliers. We address both concerns by adopting a normalized version of each 
risk measure.
30
 We rank all firms in each month according to that measure, and then define a score 
                                                          
28
 For example, assume a ‘buy’ for firm i is announced on March 31st, 2002. If this ‘buy’ is matched to firm ic in 
October 2006, we define the matched recommendation day as October 31
st
, 2006; if it is matched  to June 2003,  which 
does not have 31 days, we assume the matched recommendation day is June 30
th
, 2006. 
29
 Notice that all ‘buys’ for the same firm and the same month are mapped to one single data point in the probit model, 
and thus have the same propensity score. In a matching procedure with replacement, they are all matched to the same 
pair (ic,tc), though the resulting recommendation day for the control unit differs if the ‘buys’ are announced on different 
days of the month. We can force dispersion by requiring that each of these buys is matched to a different control unit 
(that is, without replacement). Results are not sensitive to this choice.  
30
 The raw measures, on which we base the scores, are computed as follows. For a firm i and month t, we define the 
firm beta as the coefficient from a regression of the firm daily return on the market return over the preceding year; firm 
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variable that goes from 0 (for the firms with the smallest measure in that month) to 1 (for the firm 
with largest measure in that month).
31
 Our probit model for ‘buys’ thus becomes (yearly dummies 
are also included): 
     Prob(BUY)=α+β1*score(beta)+β2*score(size)+β3*score(beme)+β0*score(mom)+ε   
We estimate this model for ‘buys’ in a sample of 372,163 firm-month observations, an 
average of 4,229 firms per month. The results, reported under the “Pre-Match” column in Panel A 
of Table A1, confirm that risk measures are important determinants of ‘buy’ recommendations. 
Analysts are more likely to issue these recommendations for firms with higher betas, higher market 
values, lower values of book-to-market (growth firms) and better performance in the recent past. 
The pseudo-R
2
 of the model is 12.5%.   
< Insert Table A1 here > 
Our matching process, discussed above, defines one control unit for each ‘buy’,32 with the 
goal that the sample of ‘buys’ and the control sample would be very similar with respect to the risk 
measures. We, next, evaluate the matching process in terms of reaching that goal. First, Panel B of 
Table A1 shows that each ‘buy’ and its respective control unit are indeed very close in terms of 
their propensity scores—with the maximum difference between them across all pairs being a mere 
0.1%. Panel C compares ‘buys’ with either randomly matched units or with their nearest-neighbor 
matches, across the four dimensions of risk used in the matching process. The pre-match analysis 
reinforces the inferences from the regression: firms receiving a ‘buy’ are much bigger, have lower 
book-to-market, higher betas and better performance, when compared to the average firm, and all 
differences are statistically significant. After the match, when compared to the nearest-neighbor, 
‘buys’ and control units do not differ significantly in any of the risk measures.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
size is the market value of its equity 7 months prior to month t; book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to 
the market value of equity, for the fiscal year preceding t; and momentum is defined as the average monthly return over 
the 6 month-period preceding t. We restrict the analysis to firms with share codes 10 or 11 and remove penny stocks 
(average trading price during the month below $5). We also require at least 60 days of past returns for an estimated beta 
to be used in the regressions. 
31
 Take firm size, for example. The normalization works as follows. Each month we sort all firms according to firm size 
and define a variable ranki,t  that is equal to 1 for the smallest firm, equal to 2 for the next firm, and equal to n for the 
biggest firm, where n is the number of firms in that month.  The score measure is defined as scorei,t=100-100*(ranki,t – 
1)/(n – 1). 
32 
Results are qualitatively the same if we define more than one control unit—let’s say, 3 or 5—per recommendation.
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We can also analyze the accuracy of the matching process by restricting the probit 
regression to the original sample of ‘buys’ plus their control units. Results are shown in the column 
labeled “Post-Match” in Panel A of Table A1. The magnitude of the coefficients on the risk 
measures decline substantially, and all coefficients become insignificant. Moreover, the pseudo-R
2
 
drops from 12.5% to 3%. In summary, the results suggest that the matching process ensures ‘buys’ 
and their control units are similar with respect to beta, size, book-to-market and momentum. 
We then repeat the propensity score method to construct a control sample for ‘sells’. We 
start with a probit modeling the likelihood that a firm receives a ‘sell’ recommendation. As with 
‘buys’, ‘sells’ are more likely to be issued for firms with higher betas and for bigger firms. Contrary 
to ‘buys’, though, ‘sells’ are more commonly issued for value and low-performing firms. The 
different loadings on the measures of risk for the probits modeling ‘sells’ vs ‘buys’ reinforce the 
need of different matching procedures for each type of recommendation. The matching procedure 
also does a good job with ‘sells’. The “Post-Match” probit leaves only one coefficient (on 
momentum) significant at the 5% level. ‘sells’ are also very similar to their control units with 
respect to the risk measures—with the exception of the score of beta, for which ‘sells’ and control 
units differ at the 5% level. 
 
1 
 
Table A1.  Propensity Score Diagnostics 
This table presents diagnostics on the propensity score methodology used to create matched samples to the samples of ‘buys’ and sells. Panel A contains parameter 
estimates of the probit models generating the propensity scores used to match ‘buys’/sells to control units. The sample includes monthly cross-sections of firms 
trading in NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex, from September 2002 to December 2009. Only firms with shares codes equal to 10 or 11 are included, and stocks with monthly 
average price below $5 are excluded. When modeling ‘buys’ (sells), the dependent variable of the probit regression is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was issued a 
recommendation with a buy (sell) signal in that month. The independent variables are normalized measures of beta, size, book-to-market and momentum. The 
normalized measure of X, score(X), is defined as follows. Each month we sort all firms according to X and define a variable ranki,t  that is equal to 1 for the firm with 
smallest X, equal to 2 for the next firm, and equal to n for the firm with biggest value of X, where n is the number of firms in that month; we then define 
score(X)i,t=100-100*(ranki,t – 1)/(n – 1). For a firm i and month t, we define the firm beta as the coefficient from a regression of the firm daily return on the market 
return over the preceding year; firm size is the market value of its equity 7 months prior to month t; book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity, for the fiscal year preceding t; and momentum is defined as the average monthly return over the 6 month-period preceding t. The Pre-Match 
column contains the parameter estimates for entire sample, prior to matching. The Pre-Match probits are used to generate the propensity scores for matching 
‘buys’/sells. The Post-Match column contains the parameter estimates of the probit estimated on the subsample of original recommendations (buys/sells) and the 
corresponding control observations, after matching. The matching procedure is the nearest-neighbor match of treatment and control firms with replacement. Panel B 
presents pairwise comparisons, across the dimensions used to match the original recommendations to the matched sample, of the recommendation (buys/sells) and 
control samples. Panel C shows the distribution of propensity scores for the treatments, controls, and the difference in estimated propensity scores. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
sdfdsf Panel A: Probit Regression Results 
   
Modelling Buys 
 
Modelling Sells 
 
 
    Pre-Match Post-Match   Pre-Match Post-Match   
 
constant 
 
-2.3684*** -0.0175 
 
-3.225*** 0.1228* 
 
   
(0.0198) (0.0322) 
 
(0.0334) (0.0704) 
          
 
score_beta 
 
0.4279*** 0.00751 
 
0.5333*** -0.0761* 
 
   
(0.0127) (0.0203) 
 
(0.0215) (0.0443) 
          
 
score_size 
 
1.2853*** 0.0088 
 
1.4506*** -0.0373 
 
   
(0.0132) (0.0219) 
 
(0.0234) (0.0513) 
          
 
score_beme 
 
-0.4001*** 0.0159 
 
0.1682*** -0.0348 
 
   
(0.0121) (0.019) 
 
(0.0196) (0.0377) 
          
 
score_mom 
 
0.2363*** -0.0252 
 
-0.1521*** -0.0729** 
 
   
(0.0112) (0.0172) 
 
(0.0185) (0.0355) 
                   
 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
 
# observations 
 
372,163 70,140 
 
372,163 16,208 
 
 
Pseudo R
2
 
 
12.43% 3.14% 
 
10.83% 2.03% 
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Table A1. (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Estimated Propensity Score Distributions 
             
 
Matching Buys 
 
   
# obs 
 
Mean SD Min P5 Median P95 Max 
              
 
difference 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
 
treatment 
 
34,910 
 
0.135 0.064 0.003 0.032 0.134 0.245 0.330 
 
 
control 
 
34,910 
 
0.135 0.064 0.003 0.032 0.134 0.245 0.330 
 
 
                      
 
                          
 
Matching Sells 
 
   
# obs 
 
Mean SD Min P5 Median P95 Max 
              
 
difference 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
 
treatment 
 
8,095 
 
0.041 0.023 0.001 0.007 0.039 0.084 0.128 
 
 
control 
 
8,095 
 
0.041 0.023 0.001 0.007 0.039 0.084 0.128 
                          
              
Panel C: Pairwise Comparisons 
  
Buys 
 
Sells 
  
Pre-Match 
 
Post-Match 
 
Pre-Match 
 
Post-Match 
    Buy Control t-test   Buy Control t-test   Sell Control t-test   Sell Control t-test 
                 score (beta) 
 
0.638 0.497 81.43 
 
0.644 0.647 -1.62 
 
0.668 0.506 47.72 
 
0.671 0.678 -2.03 
score (size) 
 
0.698 0.478 131.11 
 
0.707 0.706 0.74 
 
0.746 0.491 76.41 
 
0.749 0.752 -0.71 
score (beme) 
 
0.386 0.506 -70.31 
 
0.382 0.380 0.92 
 
0.444 0.497 -15.87 
 
0.443 0.446 -0.60 
score (mom) 
 
0.516 0.492 13.77 
 
0.517 0.520 -1.30 
 
0.452 0.495 -12.43 
 
0.446 0.453 -1.61 
                                  
                 
 
  
Table 1. Description of Benchmarks 
This table summarizes the different types of benchmarks brokers use in our sample. For each type of benchmark, the description of the benchmark  
and one example of the textual description of recommendations are provided.   
Benchmark Description Examples of textual description of recommendations 
Industry 
Recommendation is benchmarked against 
performance of peers in the same industry 
“Our ratings reflect expected stock price performance relative to each analyst's 
coverage universe.” 
Market 
Recommendation is benchmarked against 
market performance 
Performance “relative to the market index over the next 12 months.” 
Total Return 
Recommendation is based on a stock's total 
return. 
“The rating system is based on a stock's forward -12-month expected total return (price 
appreciation plus dividend yield).”  
Market/Industry 
Recommendation is benchmarked against 
market and/or industry performance. 
Buy: Expected to outperform the broader market and/or its sector over the next six to 
twelve months.  
Total/Market 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against market 
performance. 
Buy means the stock is expected to appreciate and produce a total return of at least 10% 
and outperform the S&P 500 over the next 12-18 months; 
Industry/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against industry 
performance. 
STRONG BUY–The company has strong fundamentals and/or positive near-term 
catalysts. The stock’s total return is expected to exceed the peer group’s return in the 
industry and/or appreciate 15% or more over the next 12 months; 
Market/Industry/Total 
Recommendations is based on a stock's total 
return and/or benchmarked against market 
and/or industry performance. 
Buy - anticipates appreciation of 10% or more within the next 12 months, and/or a total 
return of 10% including dividend payments,and/or the ability of the shares to perform 
better than the leading stock market averages or stocks within its particular industry 
sector. 
Market/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-
adjusted return relative to the market 
performance. 
"Underperform (U) Expected to underperform on a total return, risk-adjusted basis the 
broader U.S. equity market over 
the next 12 months."  
Industry/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-
adjusted return relative to industry 
performance. 
“Stock's total return vs. analyst's coverage on a risk-adjusted basis, for the next 12-18 
months.” 
Total/risk 
Recommendation is based on a stock's risk-
adjusted return. 
"Based on the stock's total return for the next 12-18 months on a risk-adjusted basis" 
Not sure 
Cannot identify which benchmark a broker 
uses. 
"Buy/Add – Buy if you do not own or Add to existing positions. We believe that the 
shares offer an attractive reward versus risk profile over the next 12-18 months given 
current information and defined objectives. Shares seem undervalued based on current 
valuation measures and expectations."  
Changes 
A broker changes the benchmark during our 
sample period and we cannot identify when 
the broker made the change. 
Janney Montgonery Scott LLC used total return benchmark in 2004, and used sector 
benchmark by the end of 2009.   
No data Cannot find data on the definition of ratings.   
 
  
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics on the different types of benchmarks.  Only brokerage houses which issued at least 100 recommendations to U.S. firms 
during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. For each type of benchmark, we report the number of brokers using this type of 
benchmark, the distribution of the number of recommendations issued by each broker, the total number of recommendations issued by all brokers and the 
percentage to the total number of recommendations, and the number of brokers which is amongst the biggest 20 brokers in IBES according to the total number of 
recommendations issued.  
    # of recommendations per broker       
Benchmark 
No. of 
Brokers Mean # rec 25 percentile median 75 percentile Total # rec % of all  
No. of brokers 
amongst 
biggest 20 
Industry 37 2078  332  737  2668  76868 32.81% 9 
Market 34 1230  306  627  1506  41822 17.85% 3 
Total 43 1248  217  733  1467  53676 22.91% 4 
No Data 41 408  164  211  391  16745 7.15% 0 
Industry/Risk 4 2453  694  1081  4212  9810 4.19% 1 
Total/Risk 8 1094  346  1159  1466  8753 3.74% 0 
Market/Risk 2 3307  3103  3307  3511  6614 2.82% 1 
Total/Market 3 2110  340  1626  4363  6329 2.70% 1 
Changes 2 2376  1347  2376  3405  4752 2.03% 0 
Industry/Total 2 2045  359  2045  3730  4089 1.75% 1 
Market/Industry 4 495  392  463  599  1981 0.85% 0  
Not Sure 2 772  685  772  859  1544 0.66% 0  
Market/Industry/Total 1 1291  1291  1291  1291  1291 0.55% 0  
                  
All 183         234274     
 
 
  
  
Table 3. Determinants of Benchmarks 
 
This table reports the results of estimating logistic models of the probability of adopting a certain benchmark.  The models are estimated for all brokers which use 
either industry or market or total benchmark and with at least 100 recommendations issued during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009). The dependent 
variables are as follows: Broker Age is the number of years a broker has appeared in IBES, Broker Size is defined as the ratio of the number of 
recommendations issued by a broker to the total number of recommendations by all brokers in the last year, Number of Industries is the number of industries 
covered by a broker in last year, Analyst Experience is the average  number of days an analyst has appeared in IBES at the beginning of each year within a 
brokerage house, Firm Size is the average market value of equity of all firms covered by a broker by the end of last year, BE/ME is the average ratio of book 
equity to market equity of all firms covered by a broker in last year.  Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated after clustering at the broker level. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Industry vs. Market or Total Industry vs. Market Industry vs. Total Market vs. Total 
VARIABLES Prob(Benchmark=Industry) Prob(Benchmark=Industry) Prob(Benchmark=Industry) Prob(Benchmark=Market) 
          
Log(1+Broker Age) 0.822* 0.651 1.004* 0.305 
 
(0.474) (0.569) (0.540) (0.469) 
Broker Size 94.84*** 134.3*** 76.55** -54.74 
 
(32.87) (51.59) (37.57) (46.62) 
Log(Number of Industries) -0.897*** -1.173*** -0.831** 0.261 
 
(0.278) (0.400) (0.324) (0.312) 
Log(1+Analyst Experience) -0.163 -0.246 -0.210 0.174 
 
(0.364) (0.487) (0.453) (0.417) 
Log(Firm Size) 0.101 -0.208 0.268 0.393** 
 
(0.190) (0.196) (0.219) (0.182) 
Log(1+BE/ME) -0.160 -0.263 -0.0581 0.410 
 
(0.285) (0.305) (0.346) (0.309) 
Constant -1.265 5.747 -3.271 -8.361** 
 
(3.952) (4.376) (4.692) (4.108) 
  
 
  Observations 715 441 503 486 
  
  
Table 4. Organizational Structure of Sell-Side Brokers 
 
This table compares the industry concentration of analysts employed by brokers according to their benchmarks. For each analyst and each year, we define 
industry concentration as the fraction of the analyst’s coverage universe that belongs to her most covered industry. The coverage universe of the analyst each year 
is taken as the set of firms for which the analyst issued recommendations during the year and for which the analyst hold outstanding recommendations by the end 
of the year. Panel A presents the average industry concentration according to the benchmark adopted by the analyst by the end of the year. Panel B reports results 
of yearly OLS regression of industry concentration. Industry takes value of 1 if a broker uses industry benchmark and 0 if a broker uses market or total return 
benchmarks.  # Analysts is the log of the number of analysts employed by the analyst’s broker during the year. Coverage is the log of the number of firms in the 
analyst’s coverage universe in the year. Age is the log of number of days since the analyst first entered the IBES dataset. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
. 
 
Panel A – Univariate Statistics on Industry Concentration 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sector 80.2% 80.4% 80.3% 80.4% 79.3% 78.8% 79.1% 78.1%
Market 75.3% 76.4% 77.4% 76.3% 76.1% 74.1% 75.9% 78.5%
Total 76.6% 77.0% 77.4% 76.1% 74.9% 73.6% 73.4% 70.6%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sector 79.4% 77.9% 80.5% 78.8% 77.4% 75.8% 78.5% 75.7%
Market 74.4% 75.2% 77.1% 75.4% 74.1% 72.6% 73.9% 76.7%
Total 75.5% 73.8% 75.3% 73.1% 72.0% 70.0% 71.7% 68.0%
Sample: Analysts Covering More than 5 Stocks
Sample: All Analysts
 
  
  
Table 4. (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Regressions on Industry Concentration 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept 0.7836*** 0.8436*** 0.7627*** 0.7730*** 0.8468*** 0.8400*** 0.8595*** 0.8938***
(0.0341)      (0.0333)      (0.0358)      (0.0361)      (0.0382)      (0.0371)      (0.0393)      (0.0445)      
Sector 0.0238**  0.0138       0.0018       0.0139       0.0181*    0.0283*** 0.0275**  0.0210*    
(0.0104)      (0.0103)      (0.0104)      (0.0105)      (0.0108)      (0.0108)      (0.0111)      (0.0116)      
# Analysts 0.0396*** 0.0543*** 0.0507*** 0.0510*** 0.0424*** 0.0453*** 0.0390*** 0.0488***
(0.0055)      (0.0056)      (0.0054)      (0.0056)      (0.0056)      (0.0058)      (0.0066)      (0.0070)      
Coverage 0.7836       -0.0320*** 0.7627       -0.0160*    -0.0360*** -0.0550*** -0.0340*** -0.0520***
(0.0089)      (0.0092)      (0.0094)      (0.0097)      (0.0097)      (0.0097)      (0.0091)      (0.0100)      
Age -0.0230*** -0.0300*** -0.0200*** -0.0230*** -0.0250*** -0.0230*** -0.0270*** -0.0310***
(0.0050)      (0.0046)      (0.0044)      (0.0046)      (0.0047)      (0.0045)      (0.0045)      (0.0048)      
Observations 2,054 2,021 2,054 2,040 2,004 1,948 1,921 1,706
R
2
3.0% 7.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.0% 6.0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept 0.7218*** 0.8010*** 0.7989*** 0.6354*** 0.7794*** 0.7599*** 0.8730*** 0.9340***
(0.0533)      (0.0576)      (0.0601)      (0.0705)      (0.0691)      (0.0657)      (0.0670)      (0.0746)      
Sector 0.0177       0.0170       0.0215       0.0132       0.0258*    0.0222       0.0281*    0.0255*    
(0.0127)      (0.0134)      (0.0134)      (0.0143)      (0.0148)      (0.0145)      (0.0151)      (0.0152)      
# Analysts 0.0499*** 0.0607*** 0.0532*** 0.0702*** 0.0396*** 0.0586*** 0.0430*** 0.0556***
(0.0073)      (0.0078)      (0.0075)      (0.0081)      (0.0082)      (0.0087)      (0.0093)      (0.0101)      
Coverage 0.0231       -0.0020       -0.0120       0.0342       -0.0070       -0.0270       -0.0240       -0.0580***
(0.0172)      (0.0193)      (0.0200)      (0.0225)      (0.0215)      (0.0206)      (0.0200)      (0.0217)      
Age -0.0300*** -0.0390*** -0.0290*** -0.0310*** -0.0250*** -0.0280*** -0.0340*** -0.0390***
(0.0067)      (0.0066)      (0.0061)      (0.0069)      (0.0071)      (0.0065)      (0.0059)      (0.0063)      
Observations 1,342 1,192 1,149 1,037 1,087 1,056 1,057 957
R
2
4.0% 6.0% 5.0% 8.0% 3.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0%
Sample: All Analysts
Sample: Analysts Covering More than 5 Stocks
  
Table 5. Distribution of Recommendations 
This table presents the summary statistics on the distribution of recommendations according to the types of benchmarks.  Only brokerage houses which issued at 
least 100 recommendations to U.S. firms during our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. Summary statistics are obtained for each year 
of the sample. Each observation in a yearly sample is a pair of firm and broker such that the broker has an outstanding recommendation for the firm at the end of 
the year, where an outstanding recommendation is the most recent recommendation issued by the broker to the firm during the year and that has not been 
cancelled by the broker.  The table presents for each year of the sample and each type of broker, the distribution of the outstanding recommendations at the end 
of the year, the average recommendation level, and the standard deviation of the recommendation level. In the computation of the recommendation levels, ‘strong 
buy’ and ‘buys’ are considered optimistic recommendations and are mapped to level 1; ‘holds’ are mapped to level 2; and ‘sells’ and ‘strong sells’ are considered 
pessimistic recommendations and are mapped to level 3. 
Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09
% buy 52% 45% 45% 47% 48% 51% 47% 46%
% hold 43% 49% 49% 47% 47% 45% 48% 49%
% sell 5% 7% 6% 6% 6% 4% 5% 5%
Avg rec 1.32 1.41 1.39 1.38 1.40 1.31 1.37 1.40
Std dev rec 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.92
% buy 51% 48% 46% 50% 49% 53% 52% 52%
% hold 44% 47% 49% 47% 46% 43% 44% 43%
% sell 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 6%
Avg rec 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.32 1.33 1.25 1.27 1.24
Std dev rec 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.05
% buy 37% 38% 39% 42% 40% 42% 40% 42%
% hold 44% 48% 48% 49% 50% 50% 51% 49%
% sell 18% 15% 13% 10% 10% 8% 9% 9%
Avg rec 1.76 1.70 1.65 1.58 1.60 1.57 1.61 1.58
Std dev rec 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.84 0.86
Market
benchmarker
s
Total
benchmarker
s
Sector 
benchmarker
s
 
  
  
Table 6. Logistic Regressions Relating Optimistic/Pessimistic to Different Benchmarks 
 
The table presents results of logistic regressions whose dependent variable equals 1 when a recommendation is either optimistic or pessimistic. Our sample 
period is between 9/2002 and 12/2009. All models use firm fixed effects. Optimistic recommendations are ‘strong buy’ and ‘buy,’ and pessimistic 
recommendations are ‘sell’ and ‘strong sell.’ Industry takes value of 1 if a broker uses industry benchmark and 0 if a broker uses market or total return 
benchmarks.  AFF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the broker issuing the recommendation was a lead underwriter or a co-manager in an equity offering for 
the firm in the 24 months before the recommendation announcement date. SANCT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
analyst who is employed by a sanctioned brokerage house. PASTFIRMPERF is the average daily stock return over [-180, -2]. PASTMKPERF is the average 
daily market return over [-180, -2]. Analyst EXPERIENCE is defined as the number of days the analyst has appeared in IBES. TIER3 is an indicator variable 
for whether a brokerage house uses a three-tier recommendation grid at the time a recommendation is issued. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  Prob(Rec=OPT) Prob(Rec=PESS) 
 
  
Industry -0.198*** 0.469*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.0228) 
AFF 0.318*** -0.649*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0490) 
PASTMKTPERF -2.430 -9.562 
 
(6.753) (10.31) 
PASTFIRMPERF 42.42*** -52.08*** 
 
(2.972) (4.403) 
SANCT -0.247*** 0.303*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.0243) 
EXPERIENCE -0.0179*** 0.0248*** 
 
(0.00346) (0.00643) 
TIER3 -0.275*** 0.0333 
 
(0.0127) (0.0230) 
   Observations 152,186 131,636 
  
Table 7. The Relation Between Recommendations, Earnings Forecasts and LTG Projections 
This table presents average parameter values from running monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions—models (1) and (2)—of 
recommendation levels on  measures of analysts’ forecasts regarding earnings and long-term growth (LTG). The observations are monthly firms for each month 
between September 2002 and December 2009. A firm is included in the regression for month t only if the firm has outstanding recommendations and outstanding 
forecasts regarding next annual earnings and forecasts of LTG available at the end of that month. An outstanding recommendation (forecast) issued by a broker 
to a firm at time t is the most recent recommendation (forecast) issued by the broker to that firm that is not older than 12 months and that has not been cancelled 
by the broker. Models (i) and (iii) [(ii) and (iv)] is based on recommendations and forecasts issued by industry (market or total)  benchmarkers only.  The 
dependent variable is the average recommendation level among the outstanding recommendations available for the firm at the end of the month. E/P is a score 
based on the average earnings-price ratio forecasts for the firms in the sample, where earnings forecasts are average 1-year ahead annual earnings forecasts and 
price is the observed stock price when earnings data are collected.  AI_LTG and WI_LTG (AI_E/P and WI_E/P) refer respectively to measures of across-
industry and within-industry expectations of LTG (earnings-price ratio), and are computed as follows. Starting with the LTG forecasts, each month we first 
compute for each firm the consensus LTG as the average LTG forecast amongst the outstanding forecasts available for that firm. We then define for each 
industry an industry LTG forecast as the average LTG consensus across all firms in that industry. Then, for each firm in that month we compute the firm’s 
industry-adjusted LTG forecast as the firm’s LTG forecast minus its industry LTG forecast. We compute WI_LTG as a score between 0 and 1 based on the 
ranking of industry-adjusted LTG forecasts in each industry. For each firm we also calculate an across-industry LTG score, denoted as AI_LTG, based on the 
ranking of the industry LTG forecasts across all industries. Similarly, we calculate the within- and across-industry earnings estimate rankings denoted by WI_E/P 
and AI_E/P respectively, based on the analyst earnings forecast scaled by the stock price prevailing when the earnings data are collected. Robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) are calculated using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) autocorrelation-adjusted t-statistics. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels, respectively. The reported R
2’s and number of observations are the time-series averages of the monthly cross-sectional regression measures. 
  
  
Table 7. (Continued) 
 
 
  (i) (ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) 
 
  
Industry 
Benchmarkers 
Market or Total 
Benchmarkers 
p-value 
(i)=(ii) 
Industry  
Benchmarkers 
Market or Total 
Benchmarkers 
p-value 
(iii)=(iv) 
 
  
 
  
   Intercept 2.991*** 2.859*** <0.0001  3.074*** 2.998*** 0.0041 
 
(0.060) (0.041)   (0.040) (0.039) 
 LTG -0.401*** -0.423*** 0.1868  
   
 
(0.025) (0.019)   
   AI_LTG   
 
  -0.183*** -0.264*** 0.0002 
 
  
 
  (0.036) (0.030) 
 WI_LTG   
 
  -0.349*** -0.344*** 0.6965 
 
  
 
  (0.032) (0.020) 
 E/P -0.142** -0.178***  0.0769 
   
 
(0.058) (0.041)   
   AI_E/P   
 
  -0.032* -0.107*** <0.0001 
 
  
 
  (0.017) (0.015) 
 WI_E/P   
 
  -0.131*** -0.144*** 0.3734 
 
  
 
  (0.030) (0.025) 
 
 
  
 
  
   Observations 1,028 1,425   1,028 1,425 
 R-square 5.30% 7.10%   6.30% 8.00%   
 
  
Table 8. Distribution of Recommendation Targets 
This table summarizes the distribution of buy recommendation targets for market, industry and total return 
benchmarkers in our sample. For market (or industry) benchmarkers, a buy recommendation target is defined as the 
‘x’ percent return a stock is expected to outperform the market (or industry) performance. For total return 
benchmarkers, a buy recommendation target is defined as the ‘x’ percent total return a stock is expected to achieve. 
 
 
Panel A - Market Benchmarkers Target No. of Brokers 
  
0 20 
  
5% 5 
  
10% 1 
  
15% 4 
  
20% 1 
  
N.A. 3 
        
    All 34 
    Panel B - Industry Benchmarkers Target No. of Brokers 
  
0 31 
  
5% 1 
  
10% 3 
  
20% 1 
  
N.A. 1 
        
    All 37 
    Panel C - Total Benchmarkers Target No. of Brokers 
  
7% 1 
  
10% 10 
  
15% 14 
  
20% 8 
  
25% 1 
  
30% 1 
  
N.A. 8 
        
    All 43 
  
Table 9. Performance of Recommendations and Control Units 
This table analyzes the performance of ‘buy’ and ’sell’ recommendations issued by market/industry/total benchmarkers. Our sample period is between 9/2002 
and 12/2009. Each recommendation is paired with a propensity score matched (control) unit according to the procedure described in Table A1. The table reports 
performance measures for the sample of recommendations and the corresponding sample of control units. In Panel A, the performance variable for each 
recommendation (control unit) is a dummy equal to 1 if the recommendation (control unit) achieved its stated objective. For a ‘buy’ recommendation, the stated 
objective from an industry (market) [total] benchmarker is Rindustry+target (Rmarket+target)[target], so achieving the objective means R-Rindustry - target>0 (R-
Rmarket-target>0)[R-target>0].  For a ‘sell’ recommendation, the stated objective from an industry (market) [total] benchmarker is Rindustry - target (Rmarket - 
target)[target], so achieving the objective means R-Rindustry + target<0 (R-Rmarket+target<0)[R-target<0]. For a control unit, the stated objective is the same as in 
its corresponding recommendation. In Panel B, the performance variable is the difference between the cumulative stock return and the stated objective. In Panel 
C, the performance variable is the raw return. Returns associated with a recommendation (the stock return R, the industry return Rindustry and the market return 
Rmarket) are computed during the stated life span of a recommendation—the period in which the recommendation advice is kept alive. This is the period between 
the recommendation issuance and the earliest of (i) 12 months following the recommendation issuance and (ii) the date when the recommendation advice is 
changed (e.g., though a cancelation or an upgrade/downgrade by the same analyst). Returns associated with a control unit are computed for the period starting 
with the control unit issuance date (as defined in Table A1) and with the same number of days as the stated life span of its corresponding recommendation.  P-
values for test of difference of proportions is reported under the column Diff (p-value). 
 
 
as Panel A: Proportion of Recommendations Achieving the Stated Objective 
 
                                    
    
Buys 
 
Sells 
      
% achieving the objective 
   
% achieving the objective 
    
# obs 
 
Buy 
 
Control 
 
Diff  
p-value 
 
# obs 
 
Sell 
 
Control 
 
Diff  
p-value 
  
Industry 
 
11,245 49.6% 42.8% 0.0000 
 
4,234 58.5% 47.4% 0.0000 
  
Market 
 
8,128  52.4%  47.3%  0.0000 
 
1,553  58.3%  44.0%  0.0000 
  
Total 
 
11,935  38.9%  31.2%  0.0000 
 
1,608  36.3%  19.8%  0.0000 
 
                                  
  
    
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
Table 9. (Continued) 
  
     
 
 
  
     
 
 
 Panel B: Return in Excess of the Stated Objective 
      Buys           
 
    Sells           
  Recommendation Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
 
Recommendation Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
  
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Industry 
 
0.0293 -0.0019 -0.0135 -0.0288 0.0000 0.0000 
 
-0.0315 -0.0371 0.0312 0.0087 0.0000 0.0000 
Market 
 
0.0560 0.0133 0.0162 -0.0118  0.0000  0.0000 
 
-0.0321 -0.0417 0.0488 0.0170  0.0000  0.0000 
Total 
 
-0.0485 -0.0847 -0.0789 -0.1129  0.0000  0.0000 
 
0.1136 0.0893 0.2038 0.1610  0.0000  0.0000 
                                    
                   Panel C: Raw Return 
      Buys           
 
    Sells           
  Recommendation Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
 
Recommendation Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
  
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Industry 
 
0.1013 0.0717 0.0779 0.0425 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0104 -0.0194 0.0811 0.0431 0.0000 0.0000 
Market 
 
0.1100 0.0753 0.0803 0.0382  0.0000  0.0000 
 
-0.0291 -0.0465 0.0659 0.0315  0.0000  0.0000 
Total 
 
0.0992 0.0613 0.0688 0.0310  0.0000  0.0000 
 
-0.0247 -0.0459 0.0654 0.0251  0.0000  0.0000 
                                    
  
Table 10. Decomposition of Returns 
This table analyzes the decomposition of returns in excess of the stated objective for recommendations issued by 
market/industry/total benchmarkers. The sample of recommendations and control units is described in Table 10. R 
(Rindustry) [Rmarket] refer to firm (industry) [market] returns. Such returns for a recommendation are computed during 
the stated life span of a recommendation—the period in which the recommendation advice is kept alive. This is the 
period between the recommendation issuance and the earliest of (i) 12 months following the recommendation 
issuance and (ii) the date when the recommendation advice is changed (e.g., though a cancelation or an 
upgrade/downgrade by the same analyst). The returns associated with a control unit are computed for the period 
starting with the control unit issuance date (as defined in Table A1) and with the same number of days as the stated 
life span of its corresponding recommendation.  P-values for test of difference of mean (t-test) and median 
(Wilcoxon) are reported under the columns Diff (p-value). 
Buys 
     
Recommendation 
 
Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
   
# obs 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Industry benchmarkers 
 
    
 
 
 
 
R - (Rindustry+target)  
11,245 
 0.0293 -0.0019  -0.0135 -0.0288  0.0000 0.0000 
             
 
Market Benchmarkers 
 
      
 
  
 
 
R - Rindustry  
8128 
 0.0521 0.0124  0.0135 -0.0082  0.0000 0.0000 
 
Rindustry - (Rmarket+target)  
8128 
 0.0039 -0.0037  0.0027 -0.0041  0.5785 0.3255 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Total Benchmarkers 
 
      
 
  
 
 
R - Rindustry  
11,935 
 0.0478 0.0085  0.0102 -0.0142  0.0000 0.0000 
 
Rindustry - Rmarket  
11,935 
 0.0189 0.0072  0.0174 0.0054  0.3688 0.3402 
 
Rmarket - target  
11,935 
 -0.1153 -0.0896  -0.1066 -0.0910  0.0000 0.3849 
                         
             Sells 
     
Recommendation 
 
Control 
 
Diff (p-value) 
   
# obs 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Industry benchmarkers 
 
    
 
 
 
 
R - (Rindustry - target)  
4,234 
 -0.0315 -0.0371  0.0312 0.0087  0.0000 0.0000 
             
 
Market Benchmarkers 
 
      
 
  
 
 
R - Rindustry  
1,553 
 -0.0702 -0.0645  0.0122 -0.0048  0.0000 0.0000 
 
Rindustry - (Rmarket - target)  
1,553 
 0.0381 0.0175  0.0366 0.0233  0.7424 0.1474 
 
    
       
 
 
Total Benchmarkers 
 
     
 
  
 
 
R - Rindustry  
1,608 
 -0.0692 -0.0591  0.0216 -0.0072  0.0000 0.0000 
 
Rindustry - Rmarket  
1,608 
 0.0160 0.0025  0.0138 0.0054  0.5713 0.4774 
 
Rmarket+target  
1,608 
 0.1668 0.1657  0.1684 0.1704  0.7252 0.3245 
                         
              
 
  
Figure 1. End-of-Month Distribution of Outstanding Recommendations 
This figure presents, for each month between September 2002 and December 2009, the fraction of ‘buys’ and fraction sells among the outstanding 
recommendations issued by market, total, and industry benchmarkers. Only brokerage houses which issued at least 100 recommendations to U.S. firms during 
our sample period (9/2002 – 12/2009) are included in the analysis. The solid vertical line represents the peak (December 2007) and the dashed vertical line 
represents the trough (June 2009) of the business cycle. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Monthly Net Pessimism of Total Against Market Benchmarkers (β0,Total- β0,Market) vs CFNAI 
This figure presents, for each month between September 2002 and December 2009, the measures of (β0,Total - β0,Market) and of the Chicago Fed National Activity 
Index (CFNAI). The estimate of β0,Total (β0,Market) for a specific month is the intercept from running model (2) for the sample of recommendations from total 
(market) benchmarkers for that specific month. The solid vertical line represents the peak (December 2007) and the dashed vertical line represents the trough 
(June 2009) of the business cycle. 
 
 
